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A Comparative Analysis of the British State 
Immunity Act of 1978 
I. INTRODUCTION' 
In 1975,1 Britain was the only major Western state2 that retained the ab-
solute view of sovereign immunity. 3 This view holds that a foreign state+ may 
1. See Lauterpacht, The Problem ofJurisdictioMI Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 220 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht]. Since 1975, the restrictive view has been endors-
ed in the fonn of the European Convention on State Immunity, May 16,1972,74- EUROP. T.S. 1, 
reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 470 (1972) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. The 
European Convention was adopted in Resolution 72(2) of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on January 18, 1972, was done May 16, 1972, and entered into force onJune 
11, 1976, Chart Shawing Signatures and Ratifications of Council of Europe Conventions and Agreements, 
reprinted in 161NT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 766 (1977). The restrictive view was also adopted by the 
United States in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [FSIA], 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
See Comment, Sovereign Immunity - A Statutory Approach to A Persistent Problem, 1 B. C. INT'L & COMPo 
L.J. 223 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sovereign Immunity]. 
2. The members of the Western alliance have a common social, political, economic and 
religious history. See Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), April 4, 1949,63 Stat. 
2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. 489; International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Dec. 27, 1945,60 Stat. 1401, T.l.A.S. No. 1501,2 U.N.T.S. 39. Seegennally F. 
NORTHEDGE, THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE POWERS (1974). Set also Lauterpacht, supra note 1. 
3. •• Sovereign or State Immunity is a concept of international law which has developed out of . 
the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of another State." COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORTS ON THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IMMUNITY AND THE ADDmONAL PRarocOL (1972), [hereinafter 
cited as EXPLANATORY REPORT]. 
There is a wealth of material on sovereign immunity. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1963); Lauterpacht, supra note 1; Sucharitkul, Im-
munities of Foreign States Before NatioMI Authorities, 149 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 86 
(1977); 2 D.Q'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 844 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as O'CON-
NELL]; Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEPT. 
STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]; 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS U 15-16b (1975) [hereinafter cited as DELAUME]; Note, Sovereign Immunity, 13 TEX. INT'L 
L.J. 131 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sovereign Immunity]. 
4. Numerous definitions of the concept 'State' have been advanced. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The 
General Principles of InlerruJtioMI Law, Considered from the Standpoint of The Rule of Law, 92 HAGUE 
RECUEIL DES COURS 5 (Vol. II 1957), which states: 
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not be sued in its own courts against its will. 5 However, beginning in 1976, the 
underpinnings of the absolute doctrine were eroded as the English Privy 
Council6 moved toward the acceptance of the restrictive approach of sovereign 
immunity.7 This doctrine provides exceptions to a state's immunity and per-
mits the state to be sued in the courts of a foreign country. 8 In 1977, the Court 
of Appeals of England abandoned the absolute approach and brought England 
into conformity with the policy of the western industrialized nations. 9 
A State for international purposes may, however, perhaps be described generally as an 
entity which possessing certain physical characteristics in the way of territory, a popula-
tion, and governmental institutions, is self-contained and not a part of a wider political 
unit; and which also has the capacity to enter into relations on the external plane with 
other States - either directly (in the case of fully sovereign independent States), or 
mediately, through other States (in the case of protected States.) 
[d. at 19-20. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,49 Stat. 3097 T.S. 
No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, provides: "The state as a person of international law should possess 
the following qualifications: (a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states." /d. art. 19, S 1. THE RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS UWOFTHE UNITED STATES (1965) defines the term 'State' as 
follows: "Except as otherwise indicated 'state' as used in the Restatement of this subject, means 
an entity that has defined territory and population under the control of a government and that 
engages in foreign relations." /d. S 4. 
As regards sovereign immunity, the term 'sovereign state' applies not only to the foreign state 
itself, but also to the head of state: De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (1851) 17 Q.B. 171; Sayce v. 
Ameer Ruler Sadig Mohammad Abbasi Bahawalpur State, (1952)2 Q.B. 390 (C.A.); and to the 
government: Kahan v. Pakistan Federation, (1971)2 K.B. 1003 (C.A.); or any department of the 
government, even if the department has the status of a separate legal entity under the law of the 
foreign state~ Compania Mercantil Argentia v. United States Shipping Board, (1924) 93 
L.J.K.B. 816 (C.A.); Krajina v. Tass Agency; (1949)2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.); Baccus S.R.L. v. 
Servicio Nacional Del Trigo, (1957)1 Q.B. 438 (C.A.); Mellenger v. New Brunswick Develop-
ment Corp., (1971) 1 W.L.R. 604 (C.A.); Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
(1977) 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.). In case of composite states, the term 'sovereign immunity' applies 
to the government ofa province of the state. See Swiss-Israel Trade Bank v. Government of Salta 
and Banco Provincial de Salta, (1972)1 Lloyd's Rep. 497. 
5. For its application in Britain, see 18 HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND 794 (4th ed. 1977). 
6. The jurisdiction of the Privy Council arose out of the prerogative right of the Sovereign 
as the head of all justice to entertain appeals from the courts in her dominion. The 
Sovereign exercised the jurisdiction through the council, which acted in an advisory 
capacity. As Parliament developed its power and influence, the High Court of Parlia-
ment became the final appellate tribunal for appeals from the United Kingdom, but 
appeals from the overseas territories and from certain other courts still continued to be 
heard by the Sovereign in Council. These appeals came to be regulated by the Judicial 
Committee Act, 1833, S. 3, whereby all appeals were to be heard by a special commit-
tee of the Privy Council. . . . 
The extent of the Judicial Committee's jurisdiction has considerably lessened as a result 
of the constitutional development of the British Commonwealth .... 
The Judicial Committee is an appellate Court whose handling of appeals is strictly 
judicial and not discretionary .... It is a Commonwealth and not an English court. 
10 HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND 767-81 (4th ed. 1977); See generally P. JAMES. INTRODUCTION 
TO ENGLISH LAW 49-50 (8th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JAMES). 
7. The Philippine Admiral, (1977) A.C. 373. 
8. /d. at 402. 
9. Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (1977). 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.). 
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A decision by the House of Lords or an Act of Parliament was necessary for 
the adoption of the restrictive immunity approach for all of Great Britain, 
since the English Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the other nations of 
Great Britain. 10 In 1978, the Parliament passed the State Immunity Act, 1978 
(hereinafter State Immunity Act). II This represented a comprehensive accep-
tance of the restrictive approach of sovereign immunity. 
This Comment has five major foci. First, it will examine the history of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in England. Such an analysis reveals the dif-
ficulty that English courts have had, considering restrictions on state immun-
ity. It reveals the reliance of the English courts upon the trend among Western 
states in accepting the restrictive theory. Second, the consequences of the 
English courts' alterations of a state's approach to international law will be set 
forth. Third, the State Immunity Act is examined from the perspective of 
whether it constitutes a complete adoption of the restrictive approach of 
sovereign immunity for Great Britain. It is the author's contention that the 
Act is a legislative response to the needs of the English courts as well as a state 
response to the needs of a multinational community. Fourth, it will compare 
the State Immunity Act with the European Convention on State Immunity 
(hereinafter European Convention) and the United States Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (hereinafter FSIA). Finally, the implications of the State Im-
munity Act will be discussed in view of Western interdependence and solidar-
ity, and its effect on external relationships with both Third World and Com-
munist States. 12 
II. THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND: 
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
A. The Absolute School 
The doctrine of absolute immunity originated in the international law of the 
19th century. In Great Brit~in the doctrine is stated in The Pariement Belgel3 : 
as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign 
authority and of the international comity' which induces every 
to. The names Britain and England are not used interchangeably. England is but one part of 
the United Kingdom. Decisions by the English Court of Appeals are not binding on the courts of 
Scotland and Wales. Thus, although the passage of the State Immunity Act, 1978 [State Immuni-
ty Act), c. 33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1123 (1978), prevents the House of Lords from 
overruling the recent decisions mentioned in this Comment, it does not have the power to over-
rule English decisions. In the situation where a case is appealed from the Court of Appeals of 
England to the House of Lords, and the latter affirms, the decision is binding throughout Great 
Britain. JAMES, supra note 6, at 49. 
11. 1978, c.33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1123 (1978). 
12. See Sooereign Immuniry, supra note 3, at 132-33, 140. 
13. (1880) 5 P.D. 197 (C.A.). See also Higgins, Recent Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immuni-
ry in the United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 423 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Higgins). 
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sovereign State to respect the independence and dignity of every 
other sovereign State, each and everyone declines to exercise by 
means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person 
of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the 
public property of any State which is destined to public use, or over 
the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign, am-
bassador, or property be within its territory, and therefore, but for 
the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction. a 
The absolute doctrine was a natural consequence of the respect traditionally 
granted a sovereign engaged in sovereign acts.15 For instance, international 
commerce was not viewed as an act stemming from the private ownership of a 
corporation but rather from the authority ofthe sovereign. Thus, it was stated 
that absolute immunity was derived from international law itself. "The ex-
emption of the person of every sovereign from adverse suit is to be a part of the 
law of nations . . . The universal agreement which has made these proposi-
tions part of the law of nations has been an implied agreement." 16 
In The Parlemmt Beige, the Courts of Appeals of England considered three 
questions relating to sovereign immunity. First, the Court considered whether 
it had in personam jurisdiction. Second, if it lacked in personam jurisdiction over 
a foreign sovereign, did this grant of immunity extend to suits in rem? Third, 
should there be a distinction between commercial and non-commercial ac-
tivities of the sovereign in order to limit its immunity only to the latter? The 
court found no power over a foreign sovereign in suits in personam. On this 
point the court referred to The Schooner Exchange v. M'FaddonY 
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties possessing 
equal rights and equal independence, all sovereigns have consented 
to a relaxation in practice under certain peculiar circumstances, of 
that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective ter-
14. The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P.O. at 214-15. The question whether foreign sovereigns 
can be sued ill persoMm was answered in the negative in numerous instances. See, e.g., Mighell v. 
Sultan of Jahore, (1894) 1 Q.B. 149 (C.A.); Compania Argentia v. United States Shipping 
Board, [1924)131 L.T. 388 (C.i\.); United States v. Dollfus Mieg et Cie., (1952) A.C. 582; Bac-
chus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, (1957) 1 Q.B. 438; Swiss-Israel Trade Bank v. 
Government of Salta, (1972)1 lloyd's Rep. 497. 
15. Such traditional acts are to "maintain law and order, to conduct foreign affairs and to see 
to the defense of the country." Trendtex, [1977]1 Q.B. at 555. On this subject, Blackstone wrote: 
Our King owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate on earth. Hence it is that no 
suit or action can be brought against the King even in civil matters, because no court 
can have jurisdiction over him; for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power. 
Authority to try would be in vain and idle without an authority to redress and the 
sentence of a court would be contemptible unless the court had power to command the 
execution of it .... But who shall command the King? 
W. BLACKSTONE. Commentaries 011 The Laws of England, in 1 CooLEY'S BLACKSTONE 241 (2d ed. 
1879). 
16. The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P.O. at 205. 
17. [d. at 210, Clling Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
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ritories which sovereignty confers. This perfect equality and ab-
solute independence of sovereigns has given rise to a class of cases 
in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of that 
complete territorial jurisdiction which has been stated to be the at-
tribute of every nation. One of these is the exemption of the person 
of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory. 
Why has the whole world concurred in this? The answer cannot be 
mistaken. A foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to 
subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity and 
the dignity of his nation. IS 
179 
The Court stated that a sovereign's real dignity is the essence of his im-
munity from suit in the courts of a foreign state. 19 Permitting foreign tribunals 
to obtain jurisdiction over the sovereign could compromise, if not nullify, the 
independence and equality of the sovereign. 
In The Parlement Beige, the court felt compelled to consider whether this grant 
of immunity extended to suits in rem. 20 Although an action in rem only indirect-
ly impleads the owner, it is the owner who suffers the consequences of any 
adverse decision. Thus, the court argued that in such cases "to implead an in-
dependent sovereign in such a way is to call upon him to sacrifice either his 
property or his independence. To place him in such a position is a breach of 
the principle upon which his immunity from jurisdiction rests.' '21 The court 
dismissed any possible statutory construction which sought to limit the scope 
of immunity only to ships of war. In denying this distinction, the court essen-
tially was following the rationale set forth in The Prins Frederik. 22 Such a distinc-
tion "puts all the public movable property of a State, which is in its possession 
for public purposes. . . and exemp'ts it from the jurisdiction of the courts. . . 
[since it] is inconsistent with the independence of the sovereign authority of 
the state." 23 
Finally, the court considered whether the ban against limiting immunity to 
actions in rem should be extended to the instant case where the ship was in-
volved in the carriage of goods and persons. 24 The court did not feel that the 
18. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 135-36. 
19. /d. at 136. 
20. The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P.D. at 218-19. In rem is "[a] technical term used to 
designate proceedings or actions instituted against thl thing, in contradistinction to personal actions 
which are said to be in personam. "BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 900 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
The phrases were especially applied to actions, an aetio in personam being the remedy 
where a claim against a specific person arose out of an obligation, whether IX contraetu or 
IX maleficio, while an aetio in rem was one brought for the assertion of a right of property, 
easement, status, ItC., against one who denied or infringed it. 
/d. at 899. 
21. /d. at 219. 
22. [1820) 165 Eng. Rep. 543. 
23. The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P.D. at 213. 
24. Id. at 219-20. 
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distinction between tradihg and non-trading purposes was warranted. In 
either case, such action would constitute the enforcement of an action in rem 
against the foreign state. This would result in the impleading of the sovereign 
in contravention of one of the most basic principles of international law. 25 
The issue in The Parlement Beige involved in rem jurisdiction. The court's 
underlying assumption was that it would never consider directly impleading a 
foreign sovereign in an action in personam. 26 The court affirmed the absolute 
doctrine of sovereign immunity by refusing to admit any exceptions, no mat-
ter how peripherally related to the impleading and involvement of a foreign 
sovereign. 
In Compania Naver Vascongado v. S. S. Cristina,27 the court affirmed the ab-
solute approach enunciated in The Parlement Belge as to both actions in rem and 
in personam. More recently, in Thai-Europa Tapioca Service Limited v. Government 
oj Pakistan, Directorate oj Argicultural Supplies,28 the Court of Appeals relied on 
the long-line of cases following the absolute approach in actions in personam. 
Here the court refused to find an exception even when the state was involved 
in international commerce. 29 
B. Judicial Modification oj the Doctrine oj Sovereign Immuniry'° 
Although the absolute approach to the doctrine of sovereign immunity was 
reaffirmed in Thai-Europa, some indications of a move away from such a posi-
tion were evident. Lord Denning acknowledged the existence of four excep-
tions to the absolute approach. 31 These exceptions foreshadowed two potential 
limitations on the absolute school. First, in rem actions arising in England 
which involve a foreign sovereign appeared to preclude sovereign immunity. 32 
Second, the court indicated a refusal to extend immunity when the sovereign 
is acting in a private, commercial capacity and the dispute arises in England. 33 
Within a year, both the English Privy Council and Court of Appeals con-
25. Id. at 220. 
26. ld. 
27. [1938) A.C. 4-85, 4-90. In this case, a commercial exception to the absolute rule was pro-
posed and rejected. ld. at 4-92-93, 4-96. 
28. (1975) 1 W.L.R. 14-85 (C.A.). 
29. Id. at 14-92. See Higgins, supra note 13, at 4-24-. 
30. Other scholarly comment has dealt specifically with the attitude of the English judiciary 
towards the law of sovereign immunity. These include Comment, The Changing Law of Sovereign 
Immunity, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 211 (1977); Chinkin, Trading Activities by Foreign Sovereign States and 
The Law of Sovereign Immunity, 39 MOD. L. REV. 597 (1976); Shaw, Sovereign Immunity and The 
English Courts, 126 NEW L.J. 632 (1976); Higgins, supra note 13; Marston, Sovereign Immunity For 
Commercilll Transactions: The Trendtex Case, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 280 (1977). 
31. Thai-Europa, [1975) 1 W.L.R. at 14-90-91. 
32. ld. The first three exceptions appear to preclude immunity in actions in rem arising in 
England. See note 31 supra. 
33. The fourth exception at note 31 supra appears to deny immunity when the sovereign is ac-
ting in a private commercial capacity in England. 
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sidered and accepted the exceptions set forth in Thai-Europa. 34 As a result of 
these decisions, the absolute approach was abandoned in toto while the contem-
porary doctrine of restrictive immunity simultaneously replaced it.35 These 
courts recognized that the transformation of the relationship of most sovereign 
states to their leaders, people and sister states is of such a magnitude that the 
logical underpinnings of the absolute school are no longer relevant. 36 The fact 
that the interdependence of the international system is expanding geometrical-
ly has made economic interaction between states a common occurrence and 
often a matter of private concern. This development has compelled most 
western states to abandon the antiquated notions of absolute sovereignty. 37 
C. Two Schools of Thought 
The major explanation for England's prolonged resistance to the restrictive 
or modern school of sovereign immunity is a basic philosophical disagreement 
that has persisted for about a century regarding the role of international law 
and its relationship to English law. 38 One school follows the doctrine of incor-
poration, which holds that the rules of international law are incorporated into 
English law automatically and considered to be a part of English law unless 
they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament. 39 The second school follows the 
doctrine of transformation. This theory holds that international law becomes a 
part of English law only when it is adopted by judicial decision, Parliamentary 
Act or established custom.+o 
34. See note 31 supra. 
35. See S VI.A infra. The restrictive school of sovereign immunity distinguishes between the 
public and private acts of the foreign sovereign. The public acts (jure imperii) of the sovereign are 
granted complete immunity, i.e., that which is commonly permitted under the absolute view. 
However, the private (jure gestionis) or commercial acts of the sovereign are not automatically ac-
corded immunity. In these instances, a court examines the acts on their merits. See W. BISHOP, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 660-77 (3d ed. 1971). See also O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 844-46. 
In the United States, the transformation from the absolute to the restrictive school occurred 
with the publication of the Tate Letter, supra note 3. 
36. Trendtex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 555-57. 
37. Lauterpacht, supra note 1. See Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682 (1976); Zodiak International Products Inc. v. Polish People's Republic, (1977)81 D.L.R. 3d 
656. 
38. The philosophical disagreement regarding the doctrines of incorporation and transforma-
tion has persisted for over a century. See, e.g., Reg v. Keyn, (1876)2 Ex. D. 63; Trendtex, (1977)1 
Q.B.529. . 
39. This concept has been expounded by Lord Mansfield, Sir William Blackstone, and Lord 
Lyndhurst. G. LEWIS, LEWIS ON FOREIGN JURISDICTION 66-67 (1859). "In 1853, the latter ex-
claimed in the House of Lords that 'the law of nations, according to the decision of our greatest 
judges is part of the law of England' ." ]d. 
40. In Reg v. Keyn, (1876)2 Ex. D. 63, the court first set forth the rationale ofthe transforma-
tion school: 
For writers of international law , however valuable their labours may be in elucidating 
and ascertaining the principle and rules of law, cannot make the law. To be binding, 
the law must have received the assent of nations who are bound by it .... Nor, in my 
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The English courts rejected the approach of the transformation school in 
favor of the approach of the incorporation school in two recent decisions. The 
rationale for adhering strictly to the absolute approach was intitially weakened 
in The Philippine Admiraltl and finally discarded in Trendtex Trading Corporation 
v. Central Bank of Nigeria. U In The Philippine Admiral the Privy Council upheld 
the theory of absolute immunity in an action in personam where the sovereign 
state was involved in a commercial enterprise.43 However, the Council re-
jected the absolute approach to actions in rem holding that in such situations 
the courts -should apply the restrictive approach. 44 The Council considered two 
questions that directly affected the precedents supporting the absolute ap-
proachfor actions in rem. 
First, the Council determined whether it was bound by the decision in The 
Porto Alexandre which affirmed a lower court ruling dismissing a writ in rem 
against The Portuguese Import and Export Co., Inc. 45 The company used 
The Porto Alexandre in ordinary commerce although the vessel was the prop-
erty of the Portuguese government. The Philippine Admiral court rejected the 
applicability of The Porto Alexandre for various reasons. Initially, the Council 
cited numerous English and foreign cases repudiating the logic supporting the 
implementation of the absolute theory in actions in rem. 46 Lord Cross further 
opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent of the past of other nations be 
sufficient to authorize tribunals of this country to apply without an act of Parliament, 
what would practically amount to a new law. In so doing, we should be unjustifiably 
usurping the providence of the legislature. 
[d. at 202-03. See also Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A.C. 160, 167-68; Reg. v. 
Secretary of State for The Home Department, Ex Parte Thakar, [1974] Q.B. 684, 701. 
41. [1977] A.C. 373. 
42. [1977]1 Q.B. 529. 
43. In 1956 japan made a reparation treaty with the government of the Philippines over the 
damage to the latter's property caused by japan during the second world war. To effectuate this 
treaty, the government' of the Philippines passed a reparations law which authorized a repara-
tions commission to supervise the allocation of funds and administer the goods and services ob-
tained from the treaty. Liberation, a steamship company, applied to the commission for an 
ocean-going vessel. In 1960, an agreement was consummated between these parties for a vessel 
finally named The Philippine Admiral. The agreement stated that the commission retained title 
to and ownership ofthe vessel until it was fully payed for. In 1973, several writs in rem were issued 
against Liberation by several parties who asserted that there was a breach of contract. On Oc-
tober 8, 1973, Pickering, j., ordered that the ship be appraised and sold and the proceeds payed 
into court. In response, the Reparations Commission ordered the return of the vessel since it was 
not entirely payed for. Moreover, solicitors in behalf of the government sought to have the writs 
and order of October 8th set aside. On December 14,1973, Briggs C.J., did set aside the writs in 
the four actions. However, before the full court of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, the appeal 
was unanimously reversed and the applications for dismissal of the writs were set aside. The ap-
peal to the Privy Council ensued. The Philippine Admiral, [1977] A.C. at 386-90. 
44. [d. at 402-03. 
45. [1920] P. 30 (C.A.). 
46. The Philippine Admiral, [1977] A.C. at 390-401. The Council cited: Republic of Mexico 
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Bacchus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [1957]1 Q.B. 
438; Thai-Europa Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485; 
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maintained that although The Porto Alexandre court felt bound to decide the case 
by the rule elaborated in The Parlement Beige, t7 the two cases could be 
distinguished. 48 The distinction rested on the fact that in The Porto Alexandre the 
vessel was involved exclusively in a commercial enterprise, while in The Parle-
ment Beige the vessel was only partially engaged in commerce. 49 Thus, the court 
in The Porto Alexandre would have been justified in establishing a commercial 
exception to the absolute doctrine. The Privy Council also noted that the three 
members of the court deciding The Porto Alexandre5° had serious doubts whether 
the rule of absolute immunity should extend to actions in rem when state-
owned vessels are engaged in ordinary commerce. 51 Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore5 2 
emphasized that this very point remained unsettled. However, the Privy 
Council relied upon the post World War Two trend in international law 
towards rejection of sovereign immunity for states in private commercial con-
tracts. 53 The Council noted the situation that arises when most countries (in-
cluding England) may be sued in their own courts after entering into a com-
mercial transaction while foreign states entering into identical contracts are 
held to be immune from the court's jurisdiction. 54 In rejecting the rationale of 
The Porto Alexandre, the Council recognized that there would be one rule for ac-
tions in rem and another for actions in personam. 55 This distinction was accepted 
because of the strength of the precedents, 56 i. e., no case had allowed any ex-
ception for actions in personam. Thus, with respect to actions in personam, the 
holding of The Parlement Beige remained good law. 57 
Second, the Privy Council briefly considered that, traditionally, a ship 
Sultan of Jahore v. Abubakar Tunku Aria Beridahar, [1952] A.C. 318; The Canadian Con-
queror, (1963)34 D.L.R. 2d 628; Republic of Congo v. Venne, (1972) 22 D.L.R. 3d 669. 
47. (1880) 5 P.O. 197. The Parlement BeIge court held that where a vessel is used for a 
government purpose (i.e., to carry the mail) and only peripherally for a commercial purpose, the 
vessel may not be proceeded against in rem. Thus, the court viewed an in rem proceeding as an in-
direct means of exercising control over the owner, the sovereign. The court found this an unac-
ceptable infringement with the independence and equality of the sovereign. ]d. at 220. See notes 
16-28 supra and accompanying text. 
48. The Philippine Admiral, (1977) A.C. at 394. 
49. ]d. 
50. The three members of the court were Lord Justices Bankers, Washington and Scrutton. 
]d. 
51. ld. 
52. (1894)1 Q.B. 149. 
53. The Philippine Admiral, (1977) A.C. at 373. The court considered several precedents as 
having a significant effect on the approach the English courts should now follow. These included, 
inter alia, the European Convention, supra note 1, and the Tate Leller, supra note 3. See note 49 
supra. 
54. The Philippine Admiral, (1977) A.C. at 402. 
55. ld. 
56. /d. 
57. Because the Privy Council limited the absolute approach to actions in rem, but not to ac-
tions in personam, that part of The Parlement Beige, (1880)5 P.O. 187 (C.A.), which relates to ac-
tions in personam remained good law. /d. 
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owned or used by a government was granted immunity. However, the issue 
before the Council in this instance was whether the ship was a vessel engaged 
in ordinary commerce. 58 The Council determined that although the ship 
potentially could be used by the Philippine government, it need not entertain 
such a possibility since the entire history of the vessel had been as a commer-
cial trading ship and not as a vessel of the state. 59 The Council implied a 
broader exception, i.e., whether a ship is owned or used by the government is 
secondary to how the ship is used. If the vessel is being used for a government 
purpose, then the traditional concept of sovereignty applies; if the vessel is be-
ing used in international commerce, indistinguishable from the practice of 
private ownership, the concept of sovereignty will not be applicable. 60 
In adopting a restrictive view of sovereign immunity for the first time, at 
least relative to actions in rem, the Privy Council combined aspects of both the 
incorporation and the transformation schools of thought. The court was hesi-
tant to further erode the absolute theory by extending its holding to include ac-
tions in personam, and stated that it was the responsibility of the House of Lords 
to adopt the restrictive approach.61 In the alternative, it was up to the govern-
ment to ratify the European Conventions of 1926 and 1972 on State Im-
munity62 in order to affect a substantial alteration of the English application of 
the law of sovereign immunity. However, the court did manifest some flex-
ibility. In the absence of an Act of Parliament tothe contrary, the more flexi-
ble restrictive approach adopted by the Council in actions in rem found its sup-
port in legislation adopted by the European Community and the United 
States. 63 
III. THE RESTRICTIVE ApPROACH: 
TRENDTEX TRADING CORPORATION V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
The landmark case on the issue of sovereign immunity in Trendtex Trading 
Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria (Trendtex).6+ In its consideration of whether 
courts should continue to be bound by the absolute approach, the Court of 
Appeals of England rejected the absolute approach in favor of the restrictive 
58. /d. at 403. 
59. /d. Because the determination of sovereignty is achieved by considering the government's 
purpose for using the vessel, this analysis is an example of the procedure formerly followed by 
courts in sovereign immunity cases. Today, courts look to the nature of the activity undertaken 
by the state. It is far more difficult to discern the motivation of a state than to determine whether 
the actual operation of the activity is an act jure ges/ionis or act jure imperii. See S VI.A irifra. 
60. The Philippine Admiral, [1977) A.C. at 403-04. 
61. /d. 
62. Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of 
State-Owned Ships of April 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199. [hereinafter cited as Brussels Conven-
tion); European Convention, supra note 1. 
63. See European Convention, supra note 1; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
64. [1977) 1 Q.B. 529. 
1979) SoVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT 185 
approach. 65 In November, 1975 Trendtex sought a writ against the Central 
Bank of Nigeria claiming demurrage66 on all vessels, damages for non-
acceptance of the balance of the cement outstanding and damages based on 
obligations to their suppliers. 67 The Central Bank of Nigeria sought to have 
the writ set aside on the ground that the bank was a department of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and therefore immune from suit.. The lower court set 
aside the writ and Trendtex appealed. 68 
Speaking for the court, Lord Denning first discussed the doctrines of trans-
formation and incorporation. 69 Lord Denning determined that the· court 
should adopt the approach of the incorporation school because it is the respon-
sibility of the courts to effectuate changes when Parliament has not acted. 70 
Seeing that the rules of international law have changed - and do 
change - and that the courts have given effect to the changes 
without an act of Parliament, it follows to my mind inexorably that 
the rules of international law, as existing from time to time, do form 
a part of our English law. It follows too, that a decision of this court 
- as to what was the ruling of international law 50-60 years ago -
is not binding in this court today. International law knows no rule 
of stare decisis. If this court is today satisfied that the rule of inter-
national law on a subject has changed from what it was 50-60 years 
ago, it can give effect to that change - and can apply the change in 
our English law -' without waiting for the House of Lords to do 
it. 71 
After reviewing international precedent12 and the decision of the Privy 
65. !d. at 549. The facts of Trtndtex are as follows: the Central Bank of Nigeria, which was in-
corporated in 1958, was modeled on the Bank of England. It issued legal tender and acted as 
banker and financial advisor to the Government of Nigeria. It was also involved in other matters 
involving significant government oversight. 
InJuly, 1975, the Central Bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Trendtex for 
over S14,OOO,OOO to pay for over 240,000 tons of cement which plaintiff had sold to an English 
company. The cement was to be shipped to Nigeria but there was congestion in the port of 
discharge. Thus, the Central Bank declined to make payments claimed to be due for the price 
and for demurrage. The plaintiff claimed against the bank for payments due in respect of the 
bank's breaches and repudiation of the letter of credit. !d. 
66. !d. at 551. "Demurrage is a maritime law term which is defined as follows: the sum agreed 
to be paid to the ship for delay caused without her fault, and which ordinarily does not begin to 
run until the lay days have been used up." Earn Line S.S. Co. v. Manati Sugar Co., 269 F.2d 
774, 776 (2d Cir. 1920). See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 519 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
67. Trendtex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 551. 
68. !d. at 532. 
69. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text; see also Trendtex, [1977) 1 Q.B. at 554. 
70. Trendtex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 554. 
71. !d. 
72. The Trendttx court considered Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682 (1976); the European Convention, supra note 1; and the Tate Letter, supra note 3. Trendtex, 
(1977) 1 Q.B. at 556. See generally Sinclair, The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & 
COMP. L.Q. 254 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sinclair). 
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Council in The Philippine Admiral,73 Lord Denning accepted the Privy 
Council's limitation of the absolute doctrine to actions in rem while rejecting 
the Council's refusal to extend the limitations to actions in personam, thus 
eliminating the use of the absolute approach entirely. In The Philippine Admiral, 
the Privy Council expressed its concern that overruling the traditional practice 
of the absolute school was an action to be taken only by Parliament because it 
was unlikely that the House of Lords would uphold any substantial judicial 
modification of sovereign immunity law. H However, Lord Denning 
disagreed, asserting that "this is a dismal forecast. It is out of line with the 
good sense in the rest of the judgment of the Privy Council. ' '7S He emphasized 
that the same reasoning used by the Privy Council in support of the creation of 
an exception to absolute immunity for actions in rem was applicable to a com-
plete rejection of the absolute doctrine: 
the trend of opinion in the world outside the Commonwealth since 
the last war has been increasingly against the application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity to ordinary trading trans-
action . . . Their Lordships themselves think that it is wrong that it 
should be so applied . . . . Thinking as they do that the restrictive 
theory is more consonant with justice, they do not think that they 
should be deterred from applying it.76 
Lord Denning made an important distinction between the authority of the 
House of Lords as the fmal arbiter of English domestic law as contrasted with 
its authority over matters of international law: 
I see no reason why we should wait for the House of Lords to make 
the change. After all, we are not considering here the rules of 
English law on which the House has the final say. We are consider-
ing the rules of international law . We can and should state our view 
as to those rules and apply them as we think best, leaving it to the 
House to reverse us if we are wrong. 77 
This Comment may be viewed merely as stating an obvious systemic truism: 
73. The Philippine Admiral, [1977) A.C. 373. 
74. /d. at 402. 
75. Trrndult, [1977)1 Q.B. at 556. 
76. Id., cited in The Philippine Admiral, [1977) A.C. at 402-03. In Rahimtoolas v. Nizam of 
Hyderabad, (1958) A.C. 379, Lord Denning stated what he considered to be the modern rule of 
international law in the area of sovereign immunity: 
If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative or international transac-
tions of a foreign government, or the policy of its executive, the court should grant im-
munity if asked to do so, because it does offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have 
the merits of such a dispute canvassed in the domestic courts of another country: but if 
the dispute concerns, lor instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign government 
(whether carried on by its own departments or agencies or by setting up separate legal 
entities), and it arises properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts, there is 
no ground for granting immunity. 
/d. at 422. 
77. T,endteJc, (1977)1 Q.B. at 557. 
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the Court of Appeals can decide a case with ultimate review in the House of 
Lords. 78 However, the statement may also be viewed as putting forth the 
proposition that it is the affirmative duty of the courts, and specifically the 
Court of Appeals, 79 to determine the relevant international law and properly 
apply it whether or not there is an explicit precedent of the House of Lords to 
the contrary. 80 
Lord Denning next dealt with the separate question of whether the Central 
Bank of Nigeria is "an alter ego of the government. "81 This determination 
would allow the court to decide the case on narrow grounds without reaching 
the issue of sovereign immunity. If the court refused to adopt the restrictive 
approach, the court could still deny immunity under the absolute approach if 
the bank was not a government agency. If the bank is not an alter ego of the 
government, it could not be accorded sovereign immunity. 82 After reviewing 
several cases as to what constitutes an "alter ego" and deciding that the rule is 
not clear in England or abroad,83 Lord Denning stated his own test: "looking 
to the functions and control of the organization . . . I would look to all the 
evidence to see whether the organization was under government control and 
exercised government functions. "8+ Applying this test to th~ Trendtex situa-
78. As James notes, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876,39 & 4-0 Viet., c. 59 (1876), gave 
the House of Lords the power to be "the ultimate court of appeal .... [I)t is the ultimate ap-
pellate tribunal for England and Wales, both in civil and criminal cases ... [as well as for) the 
courts of Scotland and Northern Ireland .... " JAMES. suprlJ note 6, at 4-8. 
79. The Court of Appeals has power to hear any appeals from decisions ofthe High Court in 
civil matters. The court also hears appeals from the County courts. The method of appeal is by 
rehearing. There is further right of appeal to the House of Lords. ld. at 4-8. 
80. Lord Justice Shaw went further, stating: 
The rule of s/(Jre decisis operates to preclude a court from overriding a decision which 
binds it in regard to a particular rule of (international) law, it does not prevent a court 
from applying a rule which did not exist when the earlier decision was made if the new 
rule has had the effect in international law of extinguishing the old rule. The judgment 
in The PlJrlemmt Beige cannot be a binding authority as to what form the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity would take a century after the judgment was delivered. 
TrendJex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 579. 
81. ld. at 559. In his opinion, Lord Denning did not give any weight to the Nigerian Am-
bassador's statement that the Central Bank was, in fact, a department of the state. Relying on 
Krajina v. Tass Agency, [194-9) 2 All E.R. 2740 (C.A.), he asserted that there were no standards 
by which the court could satisfactorily determine whether or not the bank is an alter ego of the 
government. Trendiex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 559. This has been interpreted to mean that Krajina may 
no longer be good law. In KrlJjina, the court held that Tass had sovereign immunity in an action 
for damages where the evidence supporting immunity was a certificate from the Soviet am-
bassador ofthe Tass' enabling statute. [194-9)2 All E.R. at 279-81. See generally Sovereign Immunity, 
supra note 3, at 135. 
82. See The Charkieh, (1973) L.R.A. & E. 59. 
83. TrendJex, (1977) 1 Q.B. at 559. 
84-. ]d. at 560. Lord Denning's test was not accepted by the entire court. LordJustice Stephen-
son rested his decision on immunity on the 'status' ofthe agency. He determined that if the bank 
was actually a governmental organization, the enabling statute establishing the bank must be 
read as creating a sovereign status. Failing to find such evidence in the statute, Lord Justice 
Stephenson refused to grant the bank immunity. Id. at 575. Set Higgins, supra, note 13, at 4-28. In 
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tion, the court was unable to determine whether the Central Bank of Nigeria 
was a government agency. Therefore, the case was not decided on this issue: 
". . . I prefer to rest my decision on the ground that there is no immunity in 
respect of commercial transactions, even for a government department. "85 
The other two judges concurring in Trendtex dealt with both of these issues, 
i.e., first, the status of the bank and second, the restrictive principle of im-
munity.86 
Second, Stephenson, L. J., rejected the Central Bank's claim of immunity 
since he did not view the bank as an organ of the government. However, he 
did believe it was proper for the Court of Appeals to abolish the absolute doc-
trine without executive or legislative action or a decision by the :tJouse of 
Lords. 87 Shaw, L.J., agreed with Lord Stephenson that the Central Bank was 
not an agency of the Nigeria government and that the proper rule of law was 
the doctrine of restrictive immunity. 88 
The rule emerging from Trendtex was twofold: first, immunity depends upon 
the relationship of the organization to the government. If the organization is 
considered an arm of the government, immunity will follow. Second, the doc-
trine of absolute immunity was abolished in favor of the restrictive approach. 
The Philippine Admiral and Trendtex have been recently followed in several 
cases.89 The most important was I Congrtso del Partido which dealt with the 
failure of a Cuban state corporation to complete an installment contract in-
volving the delivery of sugar to a Chilean company even though the latter had 
paid for the commodity. 90 The underlying reason for the breach of contract by 
the Cuban company was the 1973 overthrow of the Allende regime. 91 The 
Cuban government found tl>e newly instituted leadership politically unaccept-
able and severed diplomatic relations. Consequently, all commercial activities 
an earlier case, Mellenger v. New Brunswick Corporation, (1971)1 W.L.R. 604, Lord Denning 
stated, "If the corporation is part and parcel of the government of New Brunswick - so much so 
as to be identified with it like a government department - it can clearly claim immunity." ld. at 
608-09. He later maintained that the corporation was carrying out its governmental functions. /d. 
at 609. See Higgins, supra note 13, at 429. 
85. TrnuJ/ex, (1977) 1 Q.B. at 560. 
86. /d. at 561, 572 (Stephenson, Shaw, L.JJ., concurring). 
87. /d. at 570. 
88. /d. at 576. 
89. I Congreso del Partido, (1978)1 Q.B. 500; Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. Government of 
Uganda, (1979) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 481. 
90. I Congreso del Partido, (1978) 1 Q. B. at 506-13. Even though the parties in I Congreso del 
Partido had no substantial connection with the territorial jurisdiction of the English courts, 
jurisdiction was asserted by the courts of England because of the arrest of the ship. The court 
stated: 
Jurisdiction asserted by means of an arrest is not an exorbitant jurisdiction, By allowing 
the ships to trade, a foreign sovereign must be taken to have exposed his ships to the 
possibility of arrest, a procedure which is widely accepted among maritime nations and 
which is regulated to some extent by inter\lational convention . . . . 
[d. at 534. 
91. [d. at 506-13. 
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between the two states were cancelled.92 Mambisa, the Cuban corporation 
controlling this commercial transaction, obtained the ship the Congreso del 
Partido. 93 At that time, the Chilean owners of the cargo instituted a damage 
action for nondelivery and conversion by seeking writs in rem against the Con-
greso del Partido. 9. 
The court addressed several points previously discussed by the appellate 
court: the status of sovereign immunity as viewed by the English courts; the 
extent to which a court will investigate the nature of the sovereign's claim of 
immunity under the restrictive view; and the issue of whether the act of the 
Cuban corporation under the direction ofthe Cuban government is an act jure 
imperii. The opinion of the Admiralty Court on these points was premised 
upon the holdings in The Philippine Admiral and Trendtex. 
"[TJhe Philippine Admiral provides me with the clearest guidance that, in an 
action in rem against an ordinary trading ship, the rules of international law re-
quire me to give effect to the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity . . . .' '95 The Court discussed the relationship of the government of the 
Republic of Cuba with the corporation involved in the interstate transaction. 
The court ruled that the I Congreso del Partido was, in fact, owned by the 
government. Moreover, following Juan Ysmael & Co. Inc. v. Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia,96 the court held that a "foreign sovereign invoking 
sovereign immunity on the ground that its interest in property would be af-
fected by the judgment need not prove its tide to the property, but need only 
produce evidence to satisfy the court that its claim was not merely illusory. ' '97 
Finally, the court accepted the arguments of the Cuban government con-
cerning a matter of first impression in the Court, i. e., whether the act of the 
Cuban corporation in breaching its commercial obligations can still be con-
sidered an act jure imperii. 98 The court answered this question in the affir-
mative. It reasoned that since the Cuban government had demonstrated 
ownership of the vessel and the cause of action arose out of a governmental 
response to the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, "both claims 
therefore arise from an actw jure imperii of the Republic of Cuba: accord-
ingly. . . the Republic is entided to invoke the principle of sovereign immun-
ity .... "99 
92. /d. at 511-12. 
93. Id. at 513. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 518. 
96. (1955] A.C. 72. 
97. I Congreso del Partido, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 519. 
98. The coun considered foreign authorities in making its decision, I.g., The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). I Congreso del Partido, (1978]1 Q.B. at 
527-28. For a more complete discussion of the distinction between actsjuTI imperii and actsjuTI gu-
titmis, "' S VI.A i1fjrG. 
99. I CongrellO del Partido, -(1978) 1 Q.B. at 533. 
190 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. III, No.1 
Although the oplnlOn may appear to limit the Court of Appeal's far-
reaching decision in Trendtex, the Admiralty Court refused to deny immunity 
only where the sovereign is involved in commercial transacti9ns with a private 
trading vessel for a governmental purpose. IOO In most respects, I Congreso del 
Partido supports the conclusions of its predecessors. It accepted the reasoning 
of the appellate courts, notwithstanding the fact that the Admiralty Court is 
bound by their decisions. JOI In accepting the restrictive approach to sovereign 
immunity, it was careful not to deny immunity where the facts indicate an act 
jure imperii. From the outset, the Republic of Cuba was enraged at the conse-
quences of the coup d'etat in Chile in 1973. 102 The new Chilean military dic-
tatorship was vehemently opposed to the Castro regime and diplomatic rela-
tions were severed. 103 By balancing the nature of the commercial transaction 
against the negative impact on the Cuban government if immunity were 
denied, the court determined that the act of the Cuban government was a 
foreign policy directive and must be respected. This reasoning is consistent 
with Trendtex. 104 In Trendtex, the court never developed standards for discern-
ing an act jure imperii from an act jure gestionis. As in I Congreso del Partido, these 
standards were left to be determined on a case-by-case basis. lOS 
100. /d. at 523-33. The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the court should follow the 
United States' case of Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). I 
Congreso del Partido,[1978) 1 Q.B. at 530-31. In Alfred Dunhill, the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
that when a sovereign is involved, or becomes involved, in a commercial enterprise which is con-
sidered a commercial act or an act jure ges/ionis, a breach of that transaction by the sovereign will 
not allow an invocation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 425 U.S. at 705-06. See S VI.A in-
fra. 
101. I Congreso del Partido, [1978) 1 Q.B. at 518. Lord Justice Goff stated that even before 
the decision in Trendtex, he would not have followed the holding of The Porto Alexandre, (1920) 
P. 30 (C.A.), which strictly adhered to the absolute school of sovereign immunity as set forth in 
The Parlement Beige, [1880) 5 P.O. 197. I Congreso del Partido, (1978) 1 Q.B. at 518. 
/d. 
102. I Congreso del Partido, [1978) 1 Q.B. at 506-13. 
103. /d. 
104. See notes 64-88 supra and accompanying text. 
105. I Congreso del Partido, [1978) 1 Q.B. at 529-30. The Court remarked: 
There appears to be no consensus as to where the dividing line should be drawn be-
tween the two categories of tIC/us jure imperii and tIC/us jure ges/ionis. Differences of opin-
ion were revealed in relation to contracts for public purposes. In a case of that kind, 
courts generally look to the nature of the contract rather than to its purpose in deciding 
whether or not the contract is to be characterized as jure ges/ionis or jure imperii. . . . 
But, in my judgment, the cases only demonstrate that in the case of a contractual claim 
the nature of the contract will be relevant, not that it will necessarily be decisive of the 
question whether or not the case is concerned with an tIC/us jure imperii. If the nature of 
the contract is such that it is itself an tIC/us jure imperii, then any claim under it may be the 
tIC/us jure ges/ionis, then an ordinary breach of the contract cannot be the subject of a 
claim to immunity but the character of the contract cannot necessarily preclude a 
breach from being held to result from an tIC/us jure imperii in which event sovereign im-
munity may be claimt:d in respect of such breach. . 
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D. Analysis 
After I Congreso del Partido, the common law of sovereign immunity in 
England was compatible with the statutory law of sovereign immunity on the 
European continent l06 and in the United States. 107 Because of institutional 
limitations on rule-making in any particular judicial decision, the process of 
developing a concept of sovereign immunity similar to the European Conven-
tion on State Immunity or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act still re-
quired a Parliamentary Act or further elaboration by the Court of Appeals. 
The importance of these decisions by the Privy Council and the Court of Ap-
peals must not be underestimated. Realizing the antiquated notions underly-
ing the absolute approach, these courts refused to follow the more facile proc-
ess of judicial deference in an area of potential sensitivity in foreign relations. 
They appeared to encourage Parliament to ratify the European Convention 
on State Immunity or establish a comparable statute of its own: the State Im-
munity Act was enacted in July 1978. 108 
The decisions discussed have another potentially far-reaching result.109 It 
has been argued that domestic courts have a role beyond the traditional con-
cept of determining the proper outcome for litigants involving reference to 
domestic law and domestic parties only: 
Domestic courts have extensive experience with problems of bal-
ancing the claims of the forum against the claims of foreign states 
that have an interest in the outcome of a legal dispute. The judicial 
arena is an appropriate place for the articulation of a general view 
of international relations in which doctrines of reciprocal deference 
govern areas of significant diversity and to which common efforts at 
enforcement govern areas of significant consensus. I1O 
Through the settlement of controversies involving international law the 
courts would then become "agents of world order . . ." rather than solely 
"servants of national policy."111 In this way, courts would have an inde-
pendent but significant role in balancing the need for a stable international 
legal order against the need for a comprehensive and viable foreign policy. 
The realm of sovereign immunity is especially appropriate for judicial deter-
mination. Most questions that arise are of a private nature involving private 
litigants. The courts are well suited for determining such questions because 
106. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 1. 
107. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
108. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, reprinted jn 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1123 (1978). 
109. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1964) [hereinafter cited as FALK). 
110. /d. at 173-14. 
111. /d. 
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the essence of their function is to resolve disputes between adverse parties. 
When the dispute involves a sovereign act or act jure imperii as in I Congreso del 
Partido,1I2 the courts can defer to the political branches. 1I3 
112. See notes 89-107 supra and accompanying text. 
113. Even with the passage of the State Immunity Act, the political branches continue to have 
some imput into sovereign immunity decisions. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, § 15, rtprinted in 
17 INTL LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
However, it can be argued that in the United States the courts are taking an increasingly active 
role in foreign policy decisions while showing less deference to the political branches. 
Traditionally, in matters of foreign policy the judiciary has been viewed as subservient and 
deferential to the authority of the President. Moreover, it has been ruled that the chief executive 
has plenary power in international affairs. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). The basis for judicial deference in U.S. foreign policy was stated in C. & S. Air Lines 
v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103 (1948): 
The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political not judicial. Such 
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the 
government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex and involve large 
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a 
kind for which the judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which 
has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial in-
trusion or inquiry. 
/d. at 111. 
However, it appears that the judiciary is slowly asserting its role in the area of foreign affairs. 
Set Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the Court carefully examined the political-
question doctrine. This doctrine limits the judiciary from becoming embroiled in political con-
troversies. Although the Baker Court recognized that the area of foreign affairs is generally con-
sidered to be a political question, "[iJt is error to suppose that every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." /d. at 211. The Court further stated 
that if no conclusive action has been taken as to the meaning of the terms of a treaty, the courts 
are free to construe that treaty. 1d. at 212. Although the courts have no power to recognize a 
foreign country, once recognized, "the courts may decide independently whether a statute ap-
plies to that area." 1d. at 212. In lieu' of a definitive executive declaration abroad, the courts may 
make a judgment as to America's status in that conflict. /d. at 212-13. 
In numerous areas affecting foreign policy, there has been a growing involvement of the 
judiciary. During the Vietnam War, several justices were willing to consider the constitutionality 
of the war on the merits. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F.Supp. 553, 566 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 
F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), etrl. denied, 414 U.S. 1316 (1974). 
Set generally R. LoNGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 148-50 
(1976), which concludes that the scope of presidential power is increasingly coming under judicial 
scrutiny. He dates the origin of this process to Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952). 
Within the past few years, the courts have found themselves more directly involved in foreign 
policy. The landmark case establishing a positive judicial role in foreign affairs was Banco Na-
cional del Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Act of State doctrine by asserting that courts are not to sit in judgment of acts of foreign states oc· 
curing within their territory. /d. at 428. The Court "found implied in the Constitution an in-
dependent power for the federal courts to make law on their own authority. It was the federal 
judiciary that decided that the foreign relations of the United States required the Act of State." 
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 218-19 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), the Supreme 
Court carved out an exception to the Act of State doctrine involving acts "committed by 
sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial operations." /d. at 706. See Weber, The 
1979] SoVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT 193 
IV. UNITED KINGDOM LAW ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: 
THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT, 1978 
The English decisions that rejected the absolute approach in favor of the 
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity received legislative support in the 
State Immunity Act. IU In this act, Parliament incorporated most of the major 
aspects of The PhiLippine AdmiraL, Trendtex and I Congreso deL Partido into the most 
comprehensive body of law on the subject of sovereign immunity in the 
United Kingdom. 115 
Initially, it is important to recognize that the State Immunity Act goes fur-
ther than all of the English decisions discussed supra because those decisions 
were only rulings of the Court of Appeals of England. As a result, they were 
binding only in England proper and did not extend to the other nations of 
Great Britain. However, the legislative enactment is law not only in England 
proper, but also in Scotland, Wales, Northern Irelandll6 and any dependent 
territory to which Her Majesty by Order of Council wishes to extend its provi-
sions. 1I7 
The State Immunity Act embraces the restrictive approach 1 18 and implicitly 
accepts the traditional distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure 
gestionis. 1I9 The State Immunity Act defines these concepts by delineating 
those activities for which a state is immune from judicial process. Part I of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its OrigitlS, Me41lings 41Id Effect, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD 
PuB. ORO. 104 (1976). 
For an analysis of congressional action which has contributed to the more expansive judicial 
role in foreign alTairs, see, e.g., Rodino, Congr,ssioMi Reoiew of Executive Action,S SETON HALL L. 
REV. 524 (1974). 
114. 1978, c. 33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1123 (1978). The State Immunity Act 
(Commencement) Order 1978, S.1. No. 1572. brought the State Immunity Act, 1978 into force 
on November 22, 1978. The State Immunity Act does not apply retrospectively. State Immunity 
Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1129. For an interesting case in 
which the proceedings commenced before the State Immunity Act carne into force but was decid-
ed after it carne into force, see Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. Government of Uganda, [1979]1 
Lloyd's Rep. 481. See also Comment, Tiu Death Throes of Absolute Immunity: The Governmenl of Ug41l-
da &fore the English Courts, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 115 (1979). 
115. For a discussion on the statutory and common law.of sovereign immunity pre-dating the 
State Immunity Act, see 18 HALSBURY;S-LAWSOF ENGLAND 794 (4th ed. 1977). 
116. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 23(6), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1129. 
117. ld. S 23(7), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1129. 
118. ]d. Although no explicit reference to the restrictive approach is made, the fact that there 
are listed numerous exceptions to the absolute immunity traditionally granted foreign states is 
enough to support this proposition. The statute is silent as to the terms jure imperii and jure ges-
lionis. However, the list of exceptions includes only activities that do not constitute "public acts" 
such as commercial transactions. See, e.g., id. S 3, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
119. Actus jure imperii has been defined as acts or activities of the state which are characterized 
as public, political, governmental or sovereign for purposes of immunizing the state from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts. Actus jure gestionis are acts or activities of the state which may be 
characterized as private, commercial, or non-sovereign, thereby permitting foreign courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over the state by denying immunity to that state. See VI.A infra. 
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State Immunity Act enumerates twelve major exceptions to a state's tradi-
tional claim of immunity. 120 The most important exceptions include commer-
cial transactions of states,121 proceedings relating to property122 and personal 
injury,123 as well as actions in rem involving a commercial purpose. 124 
The State Immunity Act attempts to limit judicial discretion by setting 
specific standards for protected and unprotected activity.125 For instance, the 
act defines the term 'commercial transactions' which, read by itself, appears to 
leave significant discretion to judicial interpretation. 126 However, when read 
in the context of the entire statute, the definition substantially limits judicial 
interpretation. 127 
A. In Rem Actions: A Ratification of The Philippine Admiral 
The holding of The Philippine Admira[l28 has been ratified by the State Im-
munity Act. 129 The legislation specifically denies state immunity in admiralty 
proceedings in actions in rem when the vessel belongs to the foreign state and is 
being used for commercial purposes. 13o The State Immunity Act sets limita-
tions on state immunity for actions in rem to a greater extent than did the Privy 
Council in the Philippine Admiral. For instance, except for those states who are 
signatories of the Brussels Convention of 1926,131 a state loses its immunity 
when an action in rem is taken against a ship's cargo belonging to the state if 
120. The State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, U 2-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT"LS 
1124-26. 
121. Id. S 3(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
122. /d. S 6, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
123. /d. S 5, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
124. Id. S 10, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
125. Cj FSIA, 28 U .S.C. S 1602 (1976). In the FSIA, U.S. courts are given far greater discre-
tion than their counterparts under the State Immunity Act. The FSIA is aimed at removing the 
executive through the State Department from the determination of sovereign immunity issues. 
/d. The State Immunity Act leaves some discretion to the Parliament. State Immunity Act, 1978, 
c.33. S 15, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. See gt1l4ral/y Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1. 
126. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 3(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
'Commercial transaction' is defined here as: 
/d. 
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee of 
indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obliga-
tion; and 
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, 
professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it 
engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority. . . . 
127. /d. U 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, reprinted i" 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124-25. 
128. See notes 43-63 sll/Jm and accompanying text. 
129. 1978, c.33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1123. 
130. /d. S 10(2), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MA T'LS at 1125. 
131. See note 62 supra. 
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the activity is commercial.132 The statute also goes further than the Council 
did in The Philippine Admiral by restricting the immunity of foreign ships in ac-
tions in personam to situations where the claim is in connection with a ship in-
volved in a commercial enterprise. 133 
B. Implications oj The State Immunig Act, 1978 for Trendtex Trading Corporation v. 
Central Bank oj Nigeria 
The State Immunity ActIH affirms Trendtexl35 in most respects. The legisla-
tion accepts the court's decision to follow the restrictive school of sovereign im-
munity. The State Immunity Act is also an affirmation of Lord Denning's 
reasoning that his decision rests squarely "on the ground that there is no im-
munity in respect of commercial transactions . . . ." U6 The effect of the ex-
ceptions enumerated in Part I of the Act is to limit immunity in every case 
before a tribunal of the United Kingdom when Pte foreign state is engaging in 
a commercial activity. 137 One major focus of the Trendtex decision, at least for 
Lord Justices Stephenson and Shaw, was the question of whether the Central 
Bank of Nigeria was a department of the Federation of Nigeria or a separate 
entity.138 Both Justices concurred in finding that it was independent from the 
control of the Nigerian government. The State Immunity Act attempts to for-
mulate standards for determining when a entity is and is not an alter ego of its 
gov"ernment. 139 
The State Immunity Act sets forth three general categories which are pro-
tected by sovereign immunity. These include the "sovereign or head of State 
in his public capacity, 1+0 the government of the State1+1 and any department of 
the State." 1+2 The statute then proceeds to define in very general terms "a 
separate entity." 1+3 An entity is deemed separate when its activities have 
nothing to do with sovereign authority or where a state in similar cir-
cumstances is not immune. l 4+ The effect of these definitions is to grant im-
munity whenever any activity concerns the power and authority of the state. 
132. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 10(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
133. /d. S 10(2)(b), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS'at 1125. 
134. 1978, c.33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1123. 
135. (1977)1 Q.B. 529. 
136. /d. at 560. 
13 7. See note 126 supra, where the definition of commercial transaction is explicit in stating 
that any contract, loan or other activity is not immune. 
138. Trendtex, (1977)1 Q.B. at 572-73. 
139. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 14, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
140. /d. S 14(1)(a), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
141. /d. S 14(IXb), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
142. /d. S 14(1)(c), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
143. Id. S 14(2), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
144. ld. 
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The presumption is in favor of an expansive view of sovereign immunity. U5 
However, the statute limits the application of sovereign immunity to a 
sovereign's acts in a public capacity.u6 
Two sections of the act appear susceptible to contrary interpretations on the 
question of whether central banks of a foreign state are to be viewed as alter 
egos of the government, or as separate entities, respectively. 
1. Central Bank as Alter Ego 
The first interpretation upholds the rationale of Lord Denning on this point 
while simultaneously overruling a portion of the Trendtex opinion. On the issue 
of whether the Central Bank of Nigeria is an alter ego of the government, 
Lord Denning stated: "[I]n these circumstances I have found it difficult to 
decide whether or not the Central Bank of Nigeria should_be considered in in-
ternationallaw a department of the Federation of Nigeria, even though it is a 
separate legal entity. But on the whole, I do not think it should be. "147 Lord 
Denning's hesitancy on this question may be the reason why the statute per-
mits on interpretation granting central banks or other monetary authorities 
the privileges and immunities of a foreign state. U8 If this interpretation is ac-
cepted, the State Immunity Act overrules the portion of the Trendtex opinion 
concurred in by both Lord Justices Stephenson and Shaw holding the Central 
Bank of Nigeria to be a separate entity.149 
145. This may be going too far. Section 14( 1) ofthe State Immunity Act, id. S 14( 1), reprinted in 
17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127, may be simply interpreted as the minimum requirement of 
sovereign immunity under the restrictive approach. Without the protection afforded in this sec-
tion, sovereign immunity could be completely diluted. 
146. [d. S 20(5), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1129. 
147. Trendtex, [1977)1 Q.B. at 560. 
148. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, n 14(3) & (4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1127. Section 14(3) provides: 
If a separate entity (not being a State's central bank or other monetary authority) sub-
mits to the jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in the case of which it is entitled to im-
munity by virtue of subsection (2) above, subsections (1) to (4) of section 13 above shall 
apply to it in respect of those proceedings as if references to State were references to that 
entity. 
Section 14(4) provides: 
Property of State's central bank or other monetary authority shall not be regarded for 
the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for com-
mercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity subsections 
(1) to (3) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a State were references to the 
bank or authority. 
These sections can be read as permitting a bank to be considered automatically a department of 
the state. Even though sections 14(3) and 14(4) appear to limit this reading to procedural 
privileges in sections 13(1), (2), (3) & (4), there is nothing to suggest that it does not extend 
beyond this section. However, one may also argue that since Parliament was explicit in reference 
to section i 3, it could just as easily have stated that a central bank must be treated as a depart-
ment of the state. See Trendtex, (1977) 1 Q.B. at 572, 575. 
149. Trendtex, [1977)1 Q.B. at 572,575. 
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The significance of characterizing a central bank as a governmental depart-
ment rather than a separate entity will be in the test applied by the court. 
When a defendant central bank is sued in a British court and claims immunity 
on the basis of state status, a two-fold test will be applied. First, the court 
ascertains whether the defendant is actually a department of the state. 150 If it is 
not, then no immunity is granted. However, if it is, the court must next con-
sider if the defendant, as a state entity, comes within any of the exceptions in 
Part I of the State Immunity Act. 151 In most situations, this analysis will end 
the inquiry. In certain circumstances, the court will be compelled to make fur-
ther inquiry. If Her Majestyl52 determines that the privileges and immunities 
accorded the foreign state are greater or lesser than those accorded Great Bri-
tain by that state, Her Majesty may restrict or extend those privileges as ap-
pears appropriate. 153 Thus, Section 15 may serve two purposes. First, it allows 
for equivalence of rights between Britain and individual foreign states. This 
may be appropriate when Great Britain does not provide immunity in certain 
situations and the foreign state does. The foreign envoy may expect to be pro-
tected in a particular activity only to find that British law does not accord him 
immunity.154 This section may also be implemented when a foreign state has 
failed to provide adequate immunity for one of Britain's envoys. Thus, 
restricting the immunity generally granted to foreign states raises British 
disagreement with the sovereign immunity policy of that foreign state. It may 
also serve retaliatory political purposes. 155 Second, it allows the political bran-
ches to determine highly sensitive questions of sovereign immunity 
superseding the authority of the courtS. 156 Thus, in the situations where the 
150. This seems to be implicit in the meaning of section 14 of the State Immunity Act, 1978, 
c.33, S 14, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
151. Id. U 3-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124-26. 
152. 'Her Majesty' literally means the Queen. Historically, the King or Queen was the 
Sovereign. Today, the Queen wields minimal power and is actually only a figurehead. Thus, 
'Her Majesty' is a term connoting respect for a tradition where the Monarch did in fact have 
ultimate power. Today, the power rests within the elected body of Parliament. JAMES, supra note 
6, at 115-19. 
153. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, U 15(1)(a) & (b),. reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1127. 
154. This may be viewed asa form of due process in order to protect the foreign envoy from a 
law of which he has no fair warning. However, it may be argued that it is the responsibility of the 
state's foreign office to adequately investigate the laws of another state with which it has inter-
course and to'notify its agents concerning the nature of these laws. See 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF 
ENGLAND at 722-23, paras. 1409-11 (4th ed. 1977). 
155. If another country has mistreated a British envoy or is seeking to make a political gesture 
by taking action against an envoy, section 15, State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 15, reprinted in 
17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127, allows the government to take effective counteraction. 
156. /d. This section does seem to leave discretion on extremely sensitive issues of sovereign 
immunity to the political branches. Some may argue that this is for the better: courts are by 
nature unable and iII-equiped to handle sensitive matters affecting foreign affairs. Set C & S Air 
Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103 (1948). BuJ see FALK, supra note 109, at 173-74. 
In contrast, it appears that the U.S. Congress has decided that either no issue arising under a 
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government decides to intervene, the court is compelled to defer to the deci-
sions of Parliament. 157 
2. Separate Entity 
The second interpretation of the State Immunity Act's provisions relating to 
a central bank's status upholds the ruling in Trendtex that central banks can be 
defined as separate entities. A strict construction of the appropriate sections 
suggests such an interpretation. 158 These sections define the central banks as 
states only for limited purposes.159 The intention in defining central banks as 
states is to bring central banks under the protection of the State Immunity 
Act. 160 This section provides certain procedural privileges to states. One 
clause, in which the banks are accorded state status, serves as a bar to any 
penalty or fine being levied where the state fails to provide information or 
tangible evidence in a judicial proceeding. 161 Another clause prevents an in-
junction from issuing or an action in rem for the recovery of land or the en-
forcement of a judgment. 162 Finally, the statute specifically states that the cen-
tral bank may be characterized as a separate entity. 163 
This interpretation seems more consistent with international banking prac-
tices. Many state banks are involved in investments and other activities which 
are not related to state activity. Those state banks that are inextricably tied to 
the government are accorded state status. 16• When a bank that is not an alter 
ego is involved in governmental activity it will also be accorded state status. 
This interpretation refuses to grant blanket protection to all central banks and 
follows from the entire reasoning of the restrictive approach, i. e., states will be 
granted immunity only in their official capacity as serving a governmental 
function. Otherwise, they will be treated as private individuals being sued in a 
private cause of action. 
sovereign immunity claim before the courts will have major ramifications for foreign policy or 
that the courts are able and equipped to deal with such sensitive issues. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 
1602 (1976). "The Congress finds that the determination by the United States courts of the 
claims of foreign states to immunity from jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of 
justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States 
courts .... " [d. See gmeral?JI note 113 supra. 
157. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 15(I)(a) & (b), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1127. 
158. Id. S 14(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
159. Id. S 14(4), reprinted in l7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127, which states "and where any such 
bank or authority is a separate entity subsections (1) to (3) of that section (13) shall apply to it as if 
reference to a State were references to the Bank or authority." Id. Thus, equating a Bank with 
the State may be limited simply to the purposes of section 13 and not to a comprehensive im-
munity for banks generally. 
160. Id. S 13, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
161. [d. S 13(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
162. Id. S 13(2), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
163. [d. S 14(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
164. [d. . 
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V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT, 1978 
A discussion of the State Immunity Act in light of the European Convention 
and the FSIA is instructive because it elucidates the tremendous import of the 
two latter Acts on the former. 165 The drafters of the State Immunity Act had 
the advantage of reviewing the specific terms of both the European Conven-
tion and the FSIA. It is obvious that both acts were utilized as models for the 
text of the State Immunity Act. This section will compare the State Immunity 
Act with the European Convention and the State Immunity Act with the 
FSIA. 
A. A Compar£son of the State Immuniry Act, 1978 with The European Convention on 
State Immuniry 
One fundamental difference between the State Immunity Act and the Euro-
pean Convention is the scope of the respective legislation. The latter is ap-
plicable onry to those members of the Council of Europe that ratify the conven-
tion. The State Immunity Act is not so limited. Although certain sections of 
the State Immunity Act do speak directly to British associations solely with 
parties to the European Convention,I66 The Act has a universal impact upon 
any state having commercial, contractual or other arrangements in the United 
Kingdom. 
Although the European Convention on State Immunity was recommended 
in Resolution 72-2 of January 7, 1972 by the Council of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe,16_7 it did not enter into force for over four years. 168 At the 
time of enactment of the State Immunity Act, Britain had signed but not yet 
ratified the European Convention. 169 Although the United Kingdom has not 
ratified the European Convention yet; in most respects the State Immunity 
Act closely resembles the European Convention. In fact, "it was the original 
and main purpose ofthe Act to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Euro-
pean Convention. "170 Thus, it may be assumed that English ratification ac-
cording to the procedures of the European Convention is merely pro forma. 171 
165. See Delaume, The State Immuniry Act of the United Ki"IJdom, 73 AM.]. INT'L L. 185 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Delaume]. See also Shaw, The State Immuniry Act, 1978, 128 NEW L.J. 1136 
(1978). 
166. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 13(4-)(a), 17(a)(3), 18, 19, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS at 1126-28. 
167. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 4-70 (1972). 
168. 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 766 (1977). Set EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-7 for a 
brief historical survey of the European efTons concerning state immunity. 
169. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1123 (1978). 
170. Delaume, supra note 165, at 185 n.4-. Because ofthe numerous references to the European 
Convention within the State Immunity Act, there is little doubt that the framers of the act intend-
ed subsequent ratification of the Convention. /d. 
171. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 36-4-1, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
4-82-83. 
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1. Format 
The structure of both Acts is similar. The State Immunity Act's initial sec-
tion explicity asserts the underlying implicit assumption of the European Con-
vention: "A State is immune from the jurisdiction ofthe Courts of the United 
Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of the 
Act." 172 Both documents subsequently set forth numerous exceptions to this 
rule,173 thus adopting the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. 174 The next 
major provision of each statute governs the procedural175 problems involving 
service of process and the consequences arising from a judgment against one 
state by the courts of a state party to the European Convention. 176 The final 
clauses of both Acts deal with miscellaneous matters. 177 Thus, the format 
reveals that the State Immunity Act was patterned after the European Con-
vention. 
2. Adoption of The Restrictive Approach of Sovereign Immunity 
The State Immunity Act and the European Convention both implicitly re-
ject the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in favor of the restrictive ap-
proach. The Convention is explicit in its affirmation of the restrictive ap-
proach. The Preamble178 states: 
Taking into account the fact that there is in international law a 
tendency to restrict the cases in which a State may claim immunity 
before foreign courts; ... [dJesiring to establish in their mutual 
relations common rules relating to the scope of immunity of one 
State from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State . . . .179 
172. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 1(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124; 
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 15, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 474. This latter 
se£tion states: •• A contracting State shall be entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of another contracting State if the proceedings do not fall within Articles 1 to 14; the court 
shall decline to entertain such proceedings even if the State does not appear." /d. 
Delaume states that this constitutes a residual concept rather than a principle since it does not 
come at the outset of the Convention as in the State Immunity Act or the FSIA. Delaume, supra 
note 165, at 186. This analysis appears to attribute undue significance to the mere placement of 
the clause. Whether the general statement of immunity is positioned before or after the excep-
tions to immunity, it remains the general rule. 
173. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, H 2-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124-26. 
European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-12, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470-73. 
174. The State Immunity Act implicitly accepts the restrictive approach. See note 118 supra. 
The European Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470, explicitly 
does so. 
175. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 12-13, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126-27. 
European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 16-19, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475-76. 
176. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, U 18-19, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128. 
European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20-23, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476-77. 
177. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, U 20-23, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128-29. 
European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 24-41, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478-484. 
178. European Convention, supra note 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470. 
179. Id. 
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The European Convention explicitly adopts the distinction between actsjure 
imperii and acts jure gestionis while the State Immunity Act implicitly accepts 
these characterizations. 18o The presence or absence of the terms 'restrictive,' 
'jure imperii' or 'jure gestionis' have no effect beyond formality in the implemen-
tation of the machinery in the State Immunity Act. 
There is one traditional area under the heading of acts jure gestionis in which 
the State Immunity Act goes further than the European Convention: in rem 
and in personam actions in admiralty proceedings. 181 The European Conven-
tion does not apply to such proceedings. 182 One possible explanation for this 
difference is the precedent of The Philippine Admiral. 183 This case held that the 
restrictive theory applies in actions in rem where a state owned or controlled 
ship is used as an ordinary trading vessel. 184 The fact that the European Con-
vention does not extend its provisions to apply to these actions appears incon-
sistent with the logic that characterizes the rest of the Convention. Denying 
immunity where a state is involved in a commercial activity, whether or not it 
was commercially motivated, is the very reason for the initial adoption of the 
restrictive approach. 185 Thus, the presence of this exception in the State Im-
munity Act is consistent with the purposes of the restrictive theory even 
though it is not present in the European Convention. 
3. Immunity From Jurisdiction 
One area of comparison involves the definition of state in both the Euro-
pean Convention and The State Immunity Act. The test established in the 
European Convention is twofold: A contracting state does not include any 
legal entity which has (1) a distinct, separate existence from the executive 
organs of the state and (2) the capacity to sue or be sued. 186 The Convention 
further states that once an entity is deemed not to be a state, proceedings may 
be instituted as if that entity were a private person. However, the Convention 
has limited the extent of this statement to acts jure gestionis. 187 
The State Immunity Act's definition of state is quite similar. Under this 
statute, the term state includes references to the sovereign or other head of 
state in his public capacity, the government of the state and any department of 
180. See note 118 supra. See European Convention, supra note I, arts. 24(1), 27(2), reprinted in 11 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 474, 480. 
181. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 10, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125-26. See 
notes 128-33 supra and accompanying text. 
182. European Convention, supra note I, art. 30, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 481. 
183. [1977] A.C. 373. 
184. /d. 
185. See Tate Leiter, supra note 3. 
186. European Convention, supra note I, art. 27(1), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 480. 
187. /d. art. 27(2), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 480. 
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government. 188 This definition does not include separate entities except in 
their exercise of the sovereign's authority. 189 
These definitions are similar in that they place strict limits on grants of im-
munity. Immunity will only be available when the person or entity can prove 
that there is a clear nexus, between the activity and sovereign authority and, 
that in such a capacity a suit against it interferes with that authority. English 
case law is consistent on this point. 190 In Kr~jinia v. Tass Agency (Krajinia), 
Tucker, L.J., wrote: 
It may be that under some foreign systems of law such a separate 
existence might be considered inconsistent [with immunity], but it 
is clear from our Acts of Parliament that we do not consider the fact 
that a government department may have a separate legal juristic ex-
istence as necessarily incompatible with it being a department of a 
State for which immunity can be claimed. 191 
This case may be interpreted as stating that when a department of the British 
government is sued and its activity is not related to sovereign authority, there 
is no grant of immunity. Krajinia stands for the proposition that any entity is 
capable of being sued except when it is engaged in acts jure imperii. 
The European Convention adds an exception to a state's assertion of im-
m~nity that is not present in the State Immunity Act. Article I of the Euro-
pean Convention states that when a contracting state intervenes or institutes 
proceedings before a court of another contracting state, it assents to the 
jurisdiction of that court for the purposes of those proceedings. 192 However, 
notwithstanding this latter provision, Article 13 allows a state to intervene in a 
proceeding in which it is not a party and claim immunity, on behalf of third 
parties where it has a right or interest in property which is the subject matter of 
the proceedings. \93 Thus, the state is allowed to safeguard any property in-
terests where a suit brought by or against a Third Party affects its interests. 194 
Only where the circumstances are such that the state would have been entitled 
to immunity had proceedings been brought directly against it, will immunity 
be granted and jurisdiction denied. 195 
4. Exceptions From Immunity 
Both the State Immunity Act and the European Convention provide an ex-
pansive list of activities in which sovereign immunity is not available. 
188. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 14(a), (b) & (c), reprinted in17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1127. 
189. /d. S 14(2), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
190. Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949) 2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.). 
191. /d. at 283. 
192. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470. 
193. /d. art. 13, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 474. 
194. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 21·22. 
195. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 13, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 474. 
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Although the wording is somewhat different in the two statutes, the substance 
of the provisions is similar. 
Both Acts state that when a state submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of a 
foreign state, it is no longer immune from suit. '96 This may occur when the 
state InItIates a suit, intervenes in ongoing proceedings or files a 
counterclaim. '97 Under the European Convention, a contracting state which 
counterclaims cannot claim immunity when: (1) the counterclaim arises out of 
the same legal relationship or facts on which the principle claim is based; and 
(2) no immunity would lie if the claim was brought separately.198 The State 
Immunity Act requires only that the counterclaim arise out of the same legal 
relationship or the same facts as the principle claim. 199 Thus, situations could 
arise where a state would be immune from suit because the activity wasjure im-
perii if brought as the principle claim. However, because the state counter-
claims it forfeits its immunity. 
As a result of the unqualified language of the State Immunity Act, once a 
state or its subdivision has waived immunity by submitting to the court's 
jurisdiction, there is no procedure available to revoke the waiver.200 The 
absence of a procedure for revocation of waiver promotes fairness for both 
parties and requires the state to consider seriously the implications of its 
waiver before initiation of proceedings. Finally, the State Immunity Act re-
quires that a state's submission to proceedings extends to any subsequent ap-
peals. 201 
The State Immunity Act is flexible with regard to the capacity of individuals 
to submit to a court's jurisdiction on behalf of a state. The head of a state's 
diplomatic miSSIOn has authority to submit "in respect of any 
proceedings. "202 Moreover, "the person entering into a contract on behalf of 
the State" has authority to submit to jurisdiction in "proceedings arising out 
of the contract. "203 This may cause problems for the contracting party of the 
196. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 2(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
European Convention, supra note 1, an. 1(1), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470. 
197. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, H 2(3)(a) & (b), 2(6), repn'nted in 17 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS at 1124. 
198. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 2, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470. 
199. State Immunity Act, 1978, c,33, S 2(6), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
200. /d. U 2(1), (2), (3), (6), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. Obviously, ifa prop-
er waiver has' not been made then a revocation is unnecessary. According to section 2(4), a State 
has not submitted if the only reason it has sought to intervene is for the purpose of 2(4)(a): 
"claiming immunity"; or according to section 2(4)(b): "asserting an interest in property in cir-
cumstances such that the State would have been entitled to immunity if the proceedings had been 
brought against it." Moreover, under Section 2(5), intervention is not submission if "any step 
taken by the State in ignorance of facts entitling it to immunity if those facts could not reasonably 
have been ascertained and immunity is claimed as soon as reasonably practicable." Id. is 2(4Xa) 
& (b), 2(5). 
201. /d. S 2(6), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
202. /d. S 2(7), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at1124. 
203. /d. 
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state when the head of that state's diplomatic mission submits to the court's 
jurisdiction and the state believes that the individual is immune from pro-
ceedings. However, the absolute power given the head of the diplomatic mis-
sion, and the fact that no revocation of waiver procedures exist, precludes any 
subsequent recision of that waiver by the contracting party. 204 
The State Immunity Act and the European Convention specifically 
delineate those instances in which a state is not immune from proceedings. 205 
Similarly, the two acts deny immunity in the following situations: (1) commer-
cial transactions and contractual arrangements in the territory of the state or 
the forum;206 (2) contracts of employment in the state of the forum;207 (3) per-
sonal injuries and damage to property;208 (4) suits involving patent, trademark 
or other rights;209 (5) ownership, possession and use of property;210 (6) 
membership in a corporation;211 (7) and where a state has submitted to ar-
bitration. 212 
In certain respects, the State Immunity Act is more comprehensive than the 
European Convention. The most important distinction involves the presence 
of a definition of commercial transaction. 213 This definition is a cautious effort 
to minimize judicial discretion and to provide an explicit list of circumstances 
that will result in a denial of immunity. 
The numerous exceptions to the grant of state immunity demonstrate the 
enormous transformation in the British approach to sovereign immunity. 
There are few if any instances of commercial or contractual activity that are 
omitted. The State Immunity Act also allows for enlargement of these excep-
tions to state immunity when: 
it appears to Her Majesty that the immunities and privileges . . . are 
less than those required by any treaty, convention or other interna-
tional agreement to which that State and the United Kingdom are par-
204. See Delaume, supra note 165, at 192. 
205. See State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 3-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1124-26. European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 4-14, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
471-74. 
206. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 3(1), repn'nted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 472. 
207. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 4(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 471. 
208. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 5, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
209. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 7, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
210. [d. S 6, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. European Convention, supra note 1, 
arts. 9 & 10, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 473. 
211. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 8, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 472. 
212. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 9, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 473. 
213. See note 126 supra. 
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ties. Her Majesty may ... extend those immunities and privileges as 
appears to Her Majesty to be appropriate. 214 
205 
The State Immunity Act establishes other exceptions not included in the 
European Convention. The denial of immunity in admiralty proceedings, 
whether in rem or in personam, has been discussed supra. 215 The State Immunity 
Act does not grant immunity where the proceeding relates to a state's liability 
for value added, customs or excise taxes,216 agriculturallevies217 and "rates in 
respect of premises occupied by it for commercial purposes. "218 
5. Procedures 
The European Convention and the State Immunity Act generally are in ac-
cord with respect to the procedural rules applied in sovereign immunity pro-
ceedings. For example, both Acts require service of process to become effec-
tive upon receipt by the state's Ministry of Foreign Affairs;219 an appearance 
must be entered within two months after the initial complaint is instituted;220 
and neither Act requires a state221 to pay a fine or penalty because of failure to 
disclose documents or other evidence. 222 However, the European Convention 
allows the court to draw any conclusions concerning the refusal or failure of a 
state to supply the requested evidence. 223 The State Immunity Act is silent on 
this point. 224 
214-. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 15, reprinted ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
215. See notes 128-33 suprd. 
216. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S l1(a), rtPrilited ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
217. /d. 
218. /d. S l1(b), rtPrinted ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
219. /d. S 12(1), rtPrinltdili 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. European Convention, suprd note 
1, art. 16(4), rt/lrillted ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 474. 
220. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 12(2), rtPrinltd ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
European Convention, Suprd note 1, art. 16(4), "prillted ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475. 
221. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 14(1), rtPrilited ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
References to 'State' in the State Immunity Act are to all states which have some relation, com-
mercial or otherwise, with Great Britain; European Convention, Suprd note 1, art. 27(1), reprililed 
ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 480. Reference to 'State' in the European Convention are to those 
states party to this Convention, unless otherwise specified. [d. art. 24; reprillted ill 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS at 478. 
222. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(1), rtPri"led ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
European Convention, suprd note 1, art. 18, rtPri"led ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475. 
223. European Convention, SUprd note 1, art. 18, rtPrilited ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475. 
224. In the State Immunity Act, the absence of any directions to the court as to how the refusal 
or failure to supply the requested evidence leads to three possible conclusions. First, it is obvious 
that the court can interpret this as it chooses. Second, because of its presence in the European 
Convention, it would be redundant to restate it within the Act. Finally, its absence means that 
the court can make no use of this evidence. See gmerdlly Delaume, supro note 165, at 194-97. 
Because of the framers' knowledge of this clause within the Convention, one may assume that 
they were concerned that the unrestricted use of this evidence might grant too much discretion to 
the courts. /d. This latter interpretation is far more protective of the foreign sovereign's presumed 
immunity than the other interpretations found in the European Convention. 
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The European Convention specifically exempts a state from placing a 
security deposit or bond to guarantee court expenses. 225 Although the State 
Immunity Act does not address this point, it is more thorough in setting out 
the procedural privileges accorded states. 226 The Act does not allow the is-
suance of injunctions against a state for the recovery of land or other prop-
erty227 and property is not subject to actions in rem, sale, arrest, etc. 228 unless 
there is written consent229 by the state or unless the property is used or in-
tended to be used for commercial purposes. 230 The State Immunity Act ex-
tends these privileges to states which are parties to the European Convention 
only if they have complied with the appropriate provisions of the 
Convention. 231 
The European Convention allows a court to stay proceedings in certain 
situations. One example occurs when a party to the suit makes a motion that it 
will decline to proceed with the case either because similar proceedings have 
been initiated in that state or any tribunal of other states which are parties to 
the Convention. 232 The State Immunity Act has no similar 'provision which 
pertains to states not parties to the Convention. m Thus, if proceedings 
simultaneously are brought in a foreign court, British courts are not compelled 
to dismiss the suit due to legislative comity and deference for the other state's 
proceeding at the present time. However, it is permissible for the British 
courts to defer voluntarily as a result of the respect and comity between courts. 
When the United Kingdom ratifies the European Convention, British courts 
will be compelled to stay proceedings when they simultaneously occur in the 
courts of a party to the Convention. 2,. 
225. European Convention, supra note 1, art. I, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 475. 
226. One reason the European Convention, supra note I, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
470, need not be more specific is because of the insertion of an optional provisions section. The 
provision permits a state to make a declaration that in cases not falling within the enumerated ex-
ceptions the courts are entitled to entertain proceedings against another contracting state to the 
extent that its courts are entitled to entertain proceedings against states not party to the European 
Convention. Id. art. 24(1), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478. See Sinclair, supra note 72. 
This optional regime was included because certain States already applying that rule of 
relative immunity were afraid that acts jure gestionis might fall outside the catalogue of 
cases of non-immunity, thereby restricting the jurisdiction of their courts. It was also 
argued that the connecting factors incorporated in Articles 1-13 did not correspond ex-
actly with the rules of jurisdictional competence in these states. 
Id. at 268. 
227. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(2Xa), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
228. Id. S 13(2Xb), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
229. Id. S 13(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
230. Id. S 13(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGALMAT'LS at 1126. 
231. Id. S 13(4Xa), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
232. European Convention, supra note I, art. 19, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT!LS at 475. 
233. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 19(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128, is 
similar to the European Convention but only as it relates to the members of that Convention. 
234. This conclusion is drawn directly from article 19 ofthe European Convention, supra note 
I, art. 19, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 175-76. 
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Another procedural difference between the acts is that the State Immunity 
Act creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of a foreign state's claim that its 
property is not being used or is not intended for use for commercial purposes 
by the state. 235 There is no equivalent provision in the European Convention. 
This is further evidence that, although the drafters of the State Immunity Act 
supported the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity would be carefully pro-
tected before it was discarded. 
6. Enforcement of Judgments 
A third basis for comparison concerns the enforcement of judgments. 
That there is a distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from execution has long been recognized .... This 
distinction is recognized in the jurisprudence of the English courts 
which apply the principle that, even where a foreign state has waived 
its immunity in the proceedings, execution cannot be levied against its 
property. 236 
The common law appears to be overruled by the State Immunity Act. Ac-
cording to section 13(2): subject to subsections (3) and (4) below -
(a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction or 
order for special performance or for the recovery of land or prop-
erty; and 
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the 
enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award or, in an action in 
rem, for its arrest, detention or sale. 237 
Because this section is subject to earlier sections specifically denying immunity 
in proceedings relating to commercial transactions238 and proceedings involv-
ing contracts of employment between the state and the individual where the 
contract was made in the United Kingdom or work to be performed there,239 
the intitial denial of immunity is sufficient to preclude immunity from execu-
tion.2+0 Thus, section 13(2) is applicable only in cases where an exception from 
immunity does not exist initially and there has been no waiver of immunity. 
Moreover, process against property used or intended for commercial purposes 
235. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(5), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
Delaume notes that there are two problems which confronted the framers of the Act. First, it was 
difficult for the private claimant attempting to show that property is not being used for a 
sovereign purpose. Second, there is the real need of protecting against harassment and frivolous 
claims. Delaume, supra note 165, at 196. 
236. Sinclair, supra note 72, at 276. 
237. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(2), reprinud in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
238. !d. S 3, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
239. [d. S 4, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
240. See Delaume, supra note 165, at 195. 
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is permitted subject to two conditions: 2•t First, if the property is owned by a 
state party to the European Convention, and the proceeding does not involve 
admiralty litigation,2.2 but is a final judgment,2t3 and the state has made a 
proper declaration under Article 24 of the European Convention, issue of 
process may be taken against the property. 2H This is also true for the enforce-
ment of arbitration awards. 2t5 Second, as stated supra,2.6 there is a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the state's assertion that its property is not being used 
or intended for commercial use. 2t7 Thus, the party seeking to enforce a claim 
against a foreign state has the difficult burden of proving that the property 
which is in fact being used is intended to serve a commercial purpose. 2t8 
One part of the State Immunity Act carefully elucidates the relationship be-
tween the State Immunity Act and the European Convention. 2•9 The drafters 
of the Act were aware that no provision was made in the European Conven-
tion for the enforcement of judgments against the property of a state party to 
the Convention. 250 Thus, they permitted these states to obtain relief against 
the property of the United Kingdom if the state seeking relief had previously 
complied with Article 24 of the European Convention.251 Moreover, if the 
declaration is by a state under Article 24, it would allow the United Kingdom 
or its citizens to seek similar relief against that state in their own courts or 
British courts. This interpretation flows from the simple words of the State Im-
munity Act. It isa reasonable assumption that the drafters of the State Im-
munity Act felt certain that the British government would ratify the European 
Convention soon after the act became law. 
Although the European Convention does not provide procedures for the en-
241. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
242. /d. See also id. S 10, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125-26. 
243. See id. S 18(IXb), reprinted in 17 INT;L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128. 
244. /d. See note 251 irifra. 
245. [d. 
246. See note 240 supra and accompanying text. 
247. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(5), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
248. See note 237 supra. 
249. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(4(a), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
250. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478. 
251. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(4Xa), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
European Convention, supra note I, art. 24, reprinted in II INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 478, states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 15, any State may, when signing this Con-
vention or depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, or at any 
later date, by notification to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare 
that, in cases not falling within Articles I to 13, courts shall be entitled to entertain pro-
ceedings against another contracting State to the extent that its courts are entitled to 
entertain proceedings against States not party to the present Convention. Such a 
declaration shall be without prejudice to the immunity from jurisdiction which foreign 
States enjoy in respect of acts performed in the exercise of sovereign authority (acts juri 
imperii). 
See note 225 supra. 
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forcement of judgments, it goes into great detail on the issue of giving effect to 
judgments.252 Giving effect may have several connotations: 
The expression 'give effect' does not necessarily imply the making of a 
payment or, indeed-any transfer of property. It may signify an obliga-
tion to accept a state or affairs determined by a declaratory judgment. 
The State must submit to the judgment in good faith; this may even 
involve acquiescence in the dismissal of an action instituted in a 
foreign country and consequently, based on the same facts before one 
of its own courts or before a court of a third state. 253 
Unlike the State Immunity Act25+ or the FSIA255, no machinery exists for 
enforcing judgments in the European Convention. Thus, compliance rests 
mainly on the good faith obligation of the state to give effect to the 
judgment. 256 One article seeks to resolve the problem arising from a state's 
broad construction on the grounds justifying refusal to abide by a judgment 
against itself. 257 In this situation, the party seeking to uphold the judgment 
against a state party to the Convention can bring an action in the appropriate 
court of the state disputing the judgment. 258 This would be determined by the 
law of that state. "It is left to the law of the State concerned to determine 
whether the State may also institute proceedings before its own courts to ob-
tain a declaration that it is not bound to give effect to a judgment pronounced 
against it by a foreign court.' '259 
Additional procedures have been established to protect a private litigant 
against a state that fails to abide by a judgment of a court which is party to the 
Convention. In Part I of the Additional Protocol,260 the litigant may seek 
redress before the European Tribunal established to hear these disputes. 261 
252. European Convention, supra note I, arts. 20-23, reprinted in 11 INTL LEGAL MAT'LS at 
476-78. 
253. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 27. 
254. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S§ 13, 18, 19, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATLS at 
1126, 1128. 
255. 28 U.S.C. is 1602 (1976). 
256. The methods found in the European Convention, supra note I, arts. 20-23, reprinted in II 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476-78, contrast with the procedure to enforce judgments abroad in the 
FSIA. See notes 313-36 infra and accompanying text. 
257. European Convention, supra note I, art. 21. reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATLS at 477. 
258. [d. 
259. Sinclair, supra note 72, at 276. 
260. Additional Protocol To The European Convention on State bnmuniry, 74 EUROP. T.S., reprinted in 
II INT'L LEGAL MATLS at 485 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Additional Protocol). 
261. Id. arts. 1(IXb), 4(2). reprinttd in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATLS at 486-87. The European 
Tribunal is a court organized for the purpose of hearing cases concerned with the various issues 
related to sovereign immunity occurring between member states party to the Convention. Id. art. 
4( 1), reprinted in II INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 487. The European Tribunal consists of members of 
the European Court of Human Rights. [d. art. 4(2). reprinttd in II INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 487. 
For the non-member states acceding to the Protocol, a person possessing the qualifications re-
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Both the State Immunity Act and the European Convention are concerned 
with the problems arising from judgments in one member state against 
another member state and the requirement of recognition of this judgment in 
the latter. 262 
Both statutes recognize certain exceptions in which the state is not required 
to give effect to the judgment. These include decisions which are contrary to 
public policy263 where the state has not entered an appearance because the 
proper procedural rules have not been observed; 26+ when the judgment cannot 
be deemed final due to simultaneous proceedings on the same facts having 
been instituted previously in another court;265 where there are inconsistent 
judgments in proceedings between the same parties;266 or when a court applies 
jurisdiction rules or other laws not in accord with the laws of the state against 
which the judgment was decided and the judgment would be different if the 
proper rules were applied. 267 
7. Summary 
This analysis shows that the State Immunity Act closely resembles the Euro-
pean Convention in purpose as well as design. The drafters of the State Im-
munity Act expanded the list of exceptions present in the European Conven-
tion to state immunities or acts jure gestionis. The State Immunity Act is 
broader than the Convention in the enforcement of judgments by a court of 
the forum against a foreign state because the latter lacks any mechanism to 
allow the direct seizure or control of property other than redress in a European 
Tribunal. However, when certain conditions are met, effective enforcement of 
judgments can be compelled by seizure, arrest or sale of the foreign state's 
property in Britain. 
quire<! of members of that Court designated with the agreement of the Council of Europe shall 
also be a member of the European Tribunal. /d. The President of the European Tribunal is the 
President of the European Court of Human Rights. [d. art. 4(3), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS at 487. 
262. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 18, 19, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128. 
European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20-23, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476-78. 
263. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 19(1Xa), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476. 
European Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(2Xa), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 476. 
264. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 19(1Xb), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128. 
European Convention, supra note'l, art. 20(d), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGALMAT'LS at 476. 
265. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 19(2XhXi) & (ii), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 
at 1128. European Convention, supra note I, arts. 20(2XbXi) & (ii), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS at 476. 
266. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 19(2XbXi) & (ii), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MArLS 
at 1128. European Convention, supra note I, arts. 20(2XcXi) & (ii), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL 
MArLS at 476. 
267. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 19(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1128. 
European Convention, supra note I, art. 20(3), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 477. 
1979) SoVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT 211 
B. A Comparison of The State Immunity Act, 1978 With The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 
The FSIA268 had four goals: first, to give the exclusive jurisdiction over 
determinations of whether immunity should be granted in any specific case to 
the judiciary; second, to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as 
enunciated in the Tate Letter;269 third, to provide "the means whereby 
process may be served on foreign states would be specified;" and, fourth, to 
deny absolute immunity to foreign states concerning execution of judgments 
against them :'170 Although the second and fourth goals were related to the 
motivation for the passage of the State Immunity Act, the importance of the 
first and third goals is less obvious. Thiscomparative analysis will examine the 
goals Qf the two Acts and the methods implemented to achieve them. 
1. Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction over Determination of Sovereign 
Immunity Grants to Foreign States 
The opening section of the FSIA27I states the importance of delegating 
jurisdiction on foreign immunity questions to federal courts: 272 
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of 
the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such 
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights 
of both foreign states and litigants in United States courtS. 273 
This was an important priority of the legislation due to the uncertainty as to 
whether the legislative or judicial branch of the U.S. government had authori-
ty in this area. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, foreign states seeking im-
munity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts sought redress in the State Depart-
ment. 274 The decision of the State Department was usually final. 27s The courts 
268. 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
269. See note 3 supra .. 
270. Id. The bill in its original form as S.566, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONGo REC. 2215-16 
(1973), was introduced in the Senate on behalf of the Departments of State and Justice and is ap-
pended to a letter from Attorney General Kleindienst and Secretary of State William P. Rogers to 
the President of the Senate, aan. 22, 1973) 199 CoNG. REc. 1299 (1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'LS 118 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Jan. 22, 1973). See Department Testifies on 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Bill, 74 DEP'TOF STATE BULL. 826 (1976), where Monroe Leigh, Legal 
Advisor to the State Department, stated similar goals of the FSIA before the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. 
271. 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
272. The FSIA permits state as well as federal courts to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. is 
1604, 1610 (1976). 
273. 28 U.S.C. S 1602 (1976). 
274. Even before the Tate Letter, supra note 3, the U.S. courts had followed executive sugges-
tions. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), held that the State Department's expression was a 
"conclusive determination." Id. at 589. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 197 F.Supp. 710 
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1974). See 
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1, at 226 n.11. 
275. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 
(1945). See H.R. REP. No. 1487; 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). 
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usually deferred to the State Department based on the assumption that ques-
tions of sovereign immunity were integrally related to the executive's exten-
sive powers in the area of foreign affairs. 276 
In contrast, there is little evidence in either English case law or the language 
of the State Immunity Act to indicate an intent to grant the British judiciary 
unqualified authority in this area. It seems implicit in the State Immunity Act 
that the courts are suited to resolve issues of sovereign immunity because 
courts are most capable of resolving questions of law and fact arising between 
adverse litigants. This conclusion flows from the specificity of the entire act. 
The comprehensive enumeration of the various categories of exemptions from 
immunity expresses the legislative determination that these areas should not 
be given protection. 277 However, it remains for the court to find in any specific 
case whether the parties were, in fact, engaged in one of the enumerated un-
protected activities. 
It does not appear that the British courts are as removed as the American 
courts are from direct outside influence on their decision-making. One section 
in particular may be interpreted as providing large discretion in Parliament to 
oversee the area of sovereign immunity. 278 
Section 15(1) - !fit appears to Her Majesty that the immunities and 
privileges conferred by this Part of this Act in relation to any State -
(a) exceed those accorded by the law of that state in relation to the 
United Kingdom; or 
(b) are less than those required by any treaty, convention or other 
international agreement to which that State and the United 
Kingdom are parties, 
Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for restricting or, as 
the case may be, extending those immunities and privileges to such ex-
tent as appears to Her Majesty to be approriate. 
15(2) - Any statutory instrument containing an Order under this sec-
tion shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of 
either House of Parliament. 279 
This section is limited to those immunities and privileges conferred by "this 
part of this Act. ' '280 This refers to Part I of the State Immunity Act which sets 
forth the various exceptions to immunity,28J defines terms such as 'State' and 
'separate entity'282 and details those matters excluded from the Act. 283 Three 
276. [d. 
277. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, U 3-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124-26 
278. [d. S 15, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
279. [d. 
280. [d. 
281. /d. n 1-17, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124-28. 
282. /d. S 14, reprinted in 17 INT'LLEGAL MAT'LSat 1127. 
283. [d. S 16, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
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possible views arise from this provision. The first one is that Parliament can 
only take such action to make the British statute equivalent with the foreign 
statute by the restriction and extension of privileges and immunity in the State 
Immunity Act. The second view, presuming that Parliament can overcome 
any objections or the Order in Council occurs before the proceedings are in-
itiated, is that Parliament appears to have the discretion to intercede whenever 
it desires to affect the outcome of a particular case. The third view is that 
Parliamentary involvement is sanctioned only when there is a need for restric-
ting or extending the immunities and privileges of the Act even though it may 
affect the outcome of a particular case. 
If one accepts the first view, then Parliament has no role whatsoever in af-
fecting results in individual cases. If one accepts either the second or third 
view, there is at least some possibility that this discretion can be used to alter 
or reverse the result that would probably have resulted if the case had pro-
ceeded through the courts. This may occur in situations where the Foreign Of-
fice is seeking to improve political relations with a foreign country and a suit 
permissible under British law could conceivably harm the progress of this 
process. 
Under the FSIA there is little possibility that the State Department's view 
would be automatically binding on the court. m The State Department can 
submit a brief amicus curiae but its views are not conclusive as they were in the 
past. 285 
In the author's view, the American approach of excluding any executive in-
fluence from the decision-making process of sovereign immunity· cases is 
superior. In addition to the fact that courts are institutionally more capable of 
properly dealing with such issues, allowing others to influence the ultimate 
outcome is unfair to the parties seeking redress before the court. Prior to the 
passages of the FSIA, political influence with the State Department rather 
than the merits of the case was often determinative. 286 Thus, if Parliament 
continues to have the capability to influence determinations of sovereign im-
munity, the situation existing prior to the FSIA in the U. S. may characterize 
British efforts in this area. 287 Another view is that the British approach is much 
more realistic since the executive continues to play an important role. This 
view finds support in the difficulty courts have had distinguishing actsjure im-
perii from jure gestionis. 288 
284. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.S 1602 (1976). See Letter of Jan, 22, 1973, supra note 270. 
285. [d. 
286. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). 
287. /d. See Letter of Jan. 22, 1973, supra note 270. 
288. See S VI. A infra. 
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2. The Restrictive Approach is Particularized in Statutory Form 
Both the State Immunity Act and the FSIA, as the European Convention 
had· done before them,289 adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immuni-
ty. The major difference between the two statutes is the greater discretion that 
is delegated to the courts in the FSIA than in the State Immunity Act. Both 
Acts initially state the general rule of immunity of foreign states from judicial 
jurisdiction followed by numerous exceptions. 29o The State Immunity Act 
enumerates and comprehensively defines a greater number of exceptions. The 
following exceptions are enumerated by the State Immunity Act and are not 
present in the FSIA: 
1) contracts of employment between the state and an individual where 
the contract was made or performed in the United Kingdom;291 
2) proceedings related to patents, trade-marks, etc.;292 
3) where a state is a member in a body corporate, etc.;293 
4) where a state has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration;29. and 
5) proceedings related to taxation, duties, etc. 295 
One may argue that the FSIA implicitly extends exemptions to immunity in 
these few instances because these are believed to be the least harmful to foreign 
policy interests of the United States. The heading of section 1605 of the FSIA, 
which states, "General Exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of Foreign 
States," appears to support this argument. 296 In contrast, the State Immunity 
Act uses the phrase "Exceptions from Immunity"297 as its section heading. 
Because the FSIA only lists' general' exceptions, it omits a vast area of possi-
ble disputes. Since the actual purpose of the statute was to give the courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction, it does not seem consistent for Congress to. have created 
an exclusive and unalterable . list of exceptions. Thus, implicit in the term 
'general' is the delegation to the federal courts of power to develop common 
law in the area to supplement the broad outlines set forth in the FSIA.298 
In comparison, the State Immunity Act appears to leave little discretion to 
289. European Convention, Suf1r4 note 1, reprirtlld ill 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470. 
290. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 1(1), reprillud ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1604 (1976). 
291. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 4, reprillted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
292. ld. S 7, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
293. ld. S 8, rtprirtlld ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
294. ld. S 9, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1125. 
295. [d. S II, reprinted ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
296. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1605 (1976). 
297. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 1(1), reprirtlld ill 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1124. 
298. s" H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). Since the passage ofthe Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, United States courts have decided several cases involving this act. s" 
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F.Supp. 1097 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); United Euram Corp. v. 
U.S.S.R., 461 F.Supp. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). For an important pre-FSIA case, See Heaney v. 
Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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the courts to establish new exceptions on their own. This conclusion seems 
warranted because of the specificity of exceptions. In addition, one section 
delegates the authority to expand or restrict the privileges and immunities ac-
corded foreign states to Parliament. 299 
3. Service of Process 
There are fundamental differences between the means implemented by the 
State Immunity Act and the FSIA for the service of process on foreign states. 
One major difference between these statutes is that the FSIA is more specific. 
It sets out four ways to serve process by delivery of a summons and a com-
plaint: soo first, by special arrangement between the parties;501 second, through 
compliance with the applicable international convention;302 third, if either of 
these cannot be satisfied, by sending the summons, complaint and notice of 
suit with proper translation by any form of mail requiring signed receipt, to be 
signed by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of 
the foreign state concerned;303 fourth, if the latter cannot be achieved within 
30 days, two copies of the summons and complaint with proper translation 
and a signed receipt, are sent by the clerk of the court to the U.S. Secretary of 
State and the Director of Consular Services. The Secretary will send one copy 
through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and one copy to the clerk of 
the court. so. 
In the State Immunity Act, service of process must go through diplomatic 
channels: a writ or other document is served by transmission through the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the foreign State's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 505 
The procedures in the FSIA for service of process are comparable to a 
federal long-arm statute. 306 
The underlying jurisdictional theory of section 1608 is consonant 
with the developments in U.S. law in the area of personal jurisdic-
299. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S IS, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1127. 
300. St. H.R. REP. No. 14-87, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-26 (1976). 
301. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1608(1) (1976). 
302. /d. S 1608(2). The only international convention on service of judicial documents to 
which the U.S. is presently a party is the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial 
Documents, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (1969). In order for an international convention 
to be applicable "both the U.S. and the foreign state must be a party to the convention." H.R. 
REP. No. 14-87, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976). If neither a special arrangement nor an interna-
tional convention exists between the U.S. and the foreign state, section 1608(3) of the FSIA pro-
vides for service of process by mail. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1608(3)(1976). This is based on F.R.C.P. 
4(iXIXD). 
303. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1608(3) (1976). 
3M. ld. S 1608(4). 
305. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 12(1), r.prinfld in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
306. Delaume, slIJIrtl. note 165, at 186. See DELAUME, sllJlrtl. note 3, SS 11.05, 11.09. 
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tion .... [T]he instant provision established a method of service of 
process of foreign sovereigns determined to have "substantial con-
tacts" in the U. S. so as to make that sovereign amenable to suit in 
the Federal District Court. 307 
The State Immunity Act does not go as far. Section 12(7) specifically states 
that section 12( 1) "shall not be construed as affecting any rules of court 
whereby leave is required for the service of process outside the 
jurisdiction. "308 This section can be interpreted to mean that the Act in no 
way extends the ab~lity of a court to serve process beyond its jurisdiction. 309 
Thus, British courts have no jurisdiction over foreign states until there has 
been diplomatic service. 
One final point deserves mention. There is a significant difference between 
the method imposed by a British as contrasted with an American court in levy-
ing a judgment of default against a foreign state. 3lO In the FSIA, a default 
judgment will not be entered against a foreign state "unless the claimant 
established his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. "311 
The State Immunity Act does not require a decision on the merits for a 
default judgment. Rather, when the court is satisfied that there has been 
proper service and the time for appearance by the foreign state has expired, 
the British claimant will prevail. 312 
4. Execution of Judgments 
The FSIA section concerning immunity from execution is analogous to the 
earlier section regarding immunity from jurisdiction. 313 The general rule sup-
porting immunity is immediately followed by several exceptions to that 
rule. 314 The State Immunity Act also includes the general rule prohibiting ex-
ecution of judgment against foreign states. It mentions one broad exception: 
"[the rule] does not prevent the issue of any process in respect of property 
which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial 
307. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1, at 247. 
308. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 12(1), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. Sec-
tion 12(1) reads as follows: 
Any writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a 
State shall be served by being transmitted through the Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State and service shall be deemed to have 
been effected when the writ or document is received by the Ministry. 
Id. 
309. See Delaume, supra note 165, at 195. 
310. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 12(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
FSIA 28 U.S.C. S 1608(e) (1976). 
311. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1608(e) (1976). 
312. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 12(4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
313. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1609 (1976). Cj id. § 1604. 
314. /d. S 1605. 
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purposes. "315 However, this one clause sets the two acts apart. The State Im-
munity Act allows for execution according to section 13(4) in any suit against a 
foreign state where any property is being used for commercial purposes. 316 
This conclusion seems implicit in the fact that a limiting construction was 
placed on the similar clause in the FSIA. There, an execution of judgment 
may be obtained where "the property is or was used for commercial activity 
upon which the claim was based. "317 Thus, whenever a foreign state has prop-
erty which is determined to be utilized commercially, execution against that 
property is available even if the specific property had no relation to the specific 
suit in question. 
Both acts provide a mechanism for enforcing judgments abroad. 318 In the 
FSIA three sections specifically deal with this issue319 as contrasted with only 
several subsections in the State Immunity Act. 320 
The FSIA goes furthest in elaborating the means by which a judgment will 
be enforced. The foreign state can expect ajudgment to be executed by attach-
ment when: 1) the property is used for a commercial activity and the foreign 
state has waived immunity from the execution of a judgment;321 2) the proper-
ty is being used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based;322 
3) the execution relates to ajudgment establishing rights in property which has 
been taken in violation of international law or exchange for property taken in 
violation of international law;323 4) the execution relates to a judgment 
establishing rights in property acquired by succession or gift;324 5) the proper-
ty is immovable and-situated in the United States;325 or 6) the property con-
sists of a contractual obligation, etc. 326 
In contrast, the State Immunity Act only briefly sets out procedures for en-
forcing judgments. 327 Attachment of property is permissible where the prop-
erty is being used, or intended for use, for commercial purposes with several 
limitations. 328 The enforcement of judgments against a state party to the Euro-
pean Convention may occur only when the suit does not involve an admiralty 
315. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, § 13(4), reprinted in 17 INTL LEGAL MATLS at 1126. 
316. /d. 
317. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(2) (1976). 
318. /d. is 1609-11. 
319. /d. 
320. 1978, c.33, is 13(2) & (4), reprinted in 17 INTL LEGAL MATLS at 1126. 
321. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(I)(1976). 
322. Id. S 1610(a)(2). 
323. Id. S 1610(a)(3). 
324. Id. S 1610(a)(4)(A). 
325. /d. S 1610(a)(4)(B). 
326. Id. S 1610(a)(5). 
327. /d. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, is 13(2) & (4), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATLS at 
1126. 
328. /d. S 13(4), reprinted in 17 INTL LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
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proceeding,329 the judgment is final,330 and the state has made a declaration 
. under Article 24 of the European Convention.331 The latter declaration must 
include an agreement between Britain and the foreign state that it will permit 
enforcement of judgments. 332 
There is a more complicated procedure for enforcing judgments through the 
mechanisms set forth in the State Immunity Act against parties to the Euro-
pean Convention than against non-parties. In states not party to the European 
Convention, no written agreement is required for the British courts to execute 
judgments against these governments, as long as the property involved is be-
ing used or intended for use for commercial purposes. 333 It would appear that 
since Britain has close relationships with these states, they would permit en-
forcement of judgments more readily than other states. One possible explana-
tion for the difference is that the British knew that they would inevitably be a 
party to the European Convention. Since the Convention has no enforcement 
procedures of its own, it might pose problems if there were inconsistent provi-
sions within the State Immunity Act. 
Thus, the FSIA and the State Immunity Act are similar in that they both 
provide extensive judgment enforcement procedures. m The problem with 
these approaches is that they place foreign states in a precarious position. 
Foreign sovereigns are compelled to acquiesce to decisions by United States or 
British courts which not only rule on the merits, but can also order execution 
of those judgments against that foreign state. It was for this reason that the 
Committee of Experts that drafted the European Convention refrained from 
including such an elaborate mechanism for enforcing judgments against 
foreign states:335 
The Convention deliberately abstains from providing any 
machinery of recognition or enforcement since the primary obliga-
tion of the State is to give effect to the judgment. Moreover, enforce-
ment against the property of a foreign State is considered by some 
States to be contrary to international law, while in others it is 
governed by special rules of a restrictive nature. 336 
329. 1d. 
330. /d. S 13(4Xa), reprinJed i1l 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT"LS at 1126. 
331. /d. The enforcement of judgments can also occur where the process is for enforcing an ar-
bitral award. 1d. S 13(4Xb), repri1lted i1l 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
332. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 24, reprinJed i1l 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT"LS at 478. 
333. State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, S 13(4), repri1lted i1l 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT"LS at 1126. 
334. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. S 1609 (1976); State Immunity Act, 1978, c.33, SS 13(2) & (4), reprinted 
i1l 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 1126. 
335. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. The European Convention, supra note I, 
repri1lted i1l 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 470, was drawn up within the Council of Europe by a com-
mittee of governmental experts under the authority of the European Committee on Legal Co-
operation. 
336. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
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5. Summary 
The comparison between the FSIA and the State Immunity Act is strained 
by the inconsistency between the degree to which each supports the restrictive 
approach. For instance, because the American service of process mechanism 
has such a far reaching impact, it might follow that the mode of execution on 
assets would be equally expansive. However, the state Immunity Act, which 
has a far more traditional approach to service of process, codifies an extremely 
liberal method of attaching a foreign state's property. 
Any statutory comparison will elucidate numerous variations in the ap-
proaches. However, the FSIA and the State Immunity Act are the most recent 
efforts to incorporate the restrictive approach in detailed form by statute. 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF A UNIFIED WESTERN ApPROACH ON ISSUES 
RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
It is clear that the three statutes representing the Western approach to 
sovereign immunity have adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immuni-
ty. The implications of this unified approach for the continued international 
development of the law of sovereign immunity ~ay be significant. 
A. Standards for Detemu'ning Distinctions Between Acts Jure Imperii and Acts Jure 
Gestionis 
The restrictive approach to sovereign immunity distinguishes certain acts 
for the purposes of permitting courts to entertain suits against foreign states or 
sovereigns. Traditionally, these distinctions were based on the difference be-
tween acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis. Acts jure imperii have been iden-
tified by such generalized terms as public, political, governmental or 
sovereign. 337 Acts jure gestionis have been defined as private, commercial or 
non-sovereign.338 The problem with these characterizations is that they do 
little to specify those situations in which the courts can entertain suits against 
foreign states. 339 The European Convention was the first act to state specific 
337. See Taie Letter, supra note 3; W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 676-77 (3d ed. 1971); Har-
ris & Co. Advenising v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); O'CON· 
NELL. supra note 3, at 844-46. . 
338. See note 337 supra. 
339. Numerous authorities find great difficulty in distinguishing by means of these generalized 
distinctions of acts jure imperii and acts jure gestianis. 
It should at least be clear that there is no universal agreement on the "proper" 
sovereign functions of a government, nor upon how widely or for how long a time 
governments must have engaged in a panicular activity before it comes within the 
category of "sovereign function" as viewed by any international standard. 
Bishop, New U.S. Policy Limiting Sovereign lmmuniry 47 AM.]. INT'L L. 93, 104 (1953). See Dickin-
son, The lmmuniry of Public Ships Employed in Trade, 21 AM.]. INT'L L. 108, 110 (1927); Fitz-
maurice, State lmmuniry From Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 123 (1933); 
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standards for the general category of acts jure gestionis. 340 The FSIA sup-
plemented this list. 341 Most recently, while closely following the enumeration 
of acts in the European Convention, the State Immunity Act was even more 
comprehensive and specific in its listing of such activities. 342 
Those activities which permit a denial of immunity do not preclude judicial 
interpretation.343 There will be some close questions concerning the commer-
cial or sovereign character of an act even with the definition of 'commercial 
transaction.' One method that has been devised to differentiate between acts 
jure imperii and acts jure gestionis is to examine the nature of the activity. 
As a means for determining the distinction between acts jure imperii 
and jure gestionis one should refer to the nature of the State transaction 
and not to the motive of purpose of the State activity. It thus depends 
on whether the foreign State has acted in exercise of sovereign authori-
ty, that is, in public law or like a private person, that is, in private 
law.3H 
This approach would return the distinctions between certain acts to the discre-
tion of the courts. However, such an analysis would occur only in the in-
terstices of legislative standards. 
For the first time, courts have adequate specific elements to determine acts 
jure gestionis. The European Convention and the State Immunity Act have 
created a rebuttable presumption that immunity will not be granted unless 
there is an adequate demonstration of the sovereign nature of the state's activi-
ty.345 The exceptions to the practice of granting immunity are so broad that 
immunity will be granted only upon a strong evidentiary showing by the state 
of its sovereign involvement. Thus, if an act of the foreign state is governmen-
tal or public, immunity will not be automatically granted. Rather, the court 
will conduct a further investigation into the nature of that transaction in con-
formity with the new legislative standards. 
The implications of a specific explication of the distinction between acts jure 
imperii andjure gestionis are twofold. First, it provides manageable standards for 
Fox, Competence of Courts in Regard to Non-Sovereign Acts of Foreign States, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 632, 
636-40 (1941). 
340. See European Convention, supra note 1, arts. 4-14, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
471-74. 
341. Sinclair, supra note 72, at 266-73. 
342. See notes 213-67 supra and accompanying text. 
343. See State Immunity Act, i978, c.33, U 3-11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS at 
1124-26. 
344. Claim Against The Empire ofIran, reprinted in 45 INT'L L. REP. 57,62 (1963). See FSIA, 
28 U.S.C. S 1603(d) (1976). 
345. The Italian courts have gone the furthest in restricting immunity of foreign states. See 
Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 251-53. See also Sinclair, supra note 72, at 265. For a comprehensive 
comparative study of international sovereign immunity law, see S. SUCHARTIKUL. STATE 1M· 
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the respective state judiciaries to fairly determine whether a grant of sovereign 
immunity is proper in a specific case. Second, it provides a state con-
templating certain activities within a foreign state fair notice of those situa-
tions in which that state's courts will not accept the affirmative defense of 
sovereign immunity. In addition, it provides notice to those in the forum state 
who are involved in some activity with a foreign state as to the latter's liability 
should a default, breach, or other problem arise. Finally, the various 
legislative enactments as supplemented by judicial interpretations have pro-
pelled the law of sovereign immunity further into the restrictive approach.346 
B. The Implications of The Unified Western Approach 
There are four major consequences of the unified Western approach to 
~uvereign immunity.347 First, a unified approach among West European 
States is continued evidence of a determination to work together in interna-
tional commerce. Second, the willingness to forfeit some sovereignty in the 
area of foreign judicial enforcement of claims against the state according to the 
procedures set forth in the European Convention is evidence of the trust and 
confidence that the submission to a supra-national authority has attained. 
Third, with the codification of the FSIA and the passage of the State Immuni-
ty Act, the Western powers now have a unified approach on the issue of 
sovereign immunity.H8 Finally, it encourages the nations ofthe Third World 
that continue to observe the absolute schooP49 to reconsider their policy for re-
taining this approach. This is important because of the increasing trend of 
Western multi-national organizations towards the establishment of commer-
cial arrangements in Third World countries. If these states are unwilling to ac-
cept liability for breaches of commercial transactions, Western companies 
may invoke sanctions against these states by refusing to invest or withdrawing 
current investments. This uniformity can promote the attainment of interna-
346. However, there is evidence to show that the State Immunity Act remains somewhat pro-
tective of sovereign immunity. See note 235 supra. 
347. See Sovereign Immuniry, supra note 3, at 132, 140. 
348. Id. 
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30) 52, U.N. Doc. Al9030 (1973), and The New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 
6 U.N. GAOR, Special Supp. (No.1) U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), the developing nations strongly 
affirmed their support for strengthening sovereignty which is quite similar to the pronouncements 
made by the western powers in the 19th century. Because these states feel that they have perma-
nent sovereignty over their natural resources, limiting their sovereign control over these 
resources to the developing nations is an unacceptable concession. Thus, the FSIA, State Im-
munity Act and the European Convention can be interpreted by the Third World Countries as 
having potentially irreparable harm to their sovereign authority. See Sovereign Immuniry, supra note 
I, at 231-32. 
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tional agreement on a sovereign immunity treaty which would abolish the ab-
solute approach in favor of the restrictive approach for all nations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined four major issues affecting the international 
approach to sovereign immunity. The discussion has focused on the recent 
trend of the English courts away from the absolute approach of sovereign im-
munity toward adoption of the restrictive approach of sovereign immunity. 
These decisions550 manifest willingness to assert judicial independence in the 
arena of international legal disputes. This judicial attitude appears to have 
been a major impetus in the recent passage of the State Immunity Act. 351 
With its passage, the British Parliament became the last Western power to 
accept the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The British now have a 
comprehensive statute which addresses every major aspect of the sovereign 
immunity issue. Although the British have not formally ratified the European 
Convention on State Immunity, there has been a de facto ratification in the 
form of the State Immunity Act. The parties to this Convention have another 
member which has accepted the logic of lowering the shield of sovereignty in 
order to enable private litigants and other states to obtainjudicial resolution of 
actsjure gestionis. The British are in accord with the Western states on the sub-
ject of sovereign immunity. Although several possible ramifications of a 
unified Western approach have already been suggested, it is clear that the law 
of sovereign immunity remains a dynamic issue among legal academicians as 
well as among the states that comprise the international system. 
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